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Article
Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law
JUSTIN HUGHES
Among the many kinds of works eligible for copyright protection,
audiovisual works are arguably the most complex, involving screenwriters,
directors, actors, cinematographers, producers, set designers, costume
designers, lighting technicians, etc. Some countries expressly recognize
which categories of these contributors are entitled to legal protection, but
American copyright law does not. Because the complex relationships among
these creative professionals are usually governed by contract, there is
relatively little case law on issues of authorship in audiovisual works. This
is especially true on the question of dramatic performers as authors of
audiovisual works.
This Article provides the first in-depth exploration of whether, when,
and how actors are authors under American copyright law. After describing
how case law, government views, and scholarly commentary support the
conclusion that actors are authors, the Article analyzes the strange—and
strangely inconclusive—2015 Garcia v. Google litigation. The Article then
uses some simple thought experiments to establish how dramatic performers
generally meet both the Constitutional and statutory standard for
“authorship.” Finally, the Article reviews the various filters that prevent
actors-as-authors legal struggles and how, when all else fails, we can
consider actors as joint authors of the audiovisual works embodying their
dramatic performances.
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Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law
JUSTIN HUGHES *
INTRODUCTION
There are many familiar, deep-seated disagreements in intellectual
property law—for example, varied points of view on exhaustion of rights,
the scope of patentable subject matter in the United States, or whether the
right of distribution in American copyright law encompasses “making
available.”1 But occasionally, there are places in the intellectual property
landscape that hold unexpected—and unexplored—uncertainty. The
protection of dramatic performances under American copyright law seems
to be one of those areas. What one commentator noted in 2001 remains true
today: “There is little case law or statutory authority as to the position of
performers as authors of an audiovisual work under U.S. law.”2 The question
is simple: under American copyright law can an actor be an author of the
audiovisual works in which he or she performs?
Reviewing the few points of law and commentary on the question and
placing American copyright in the larger framework of international
intellectual property norms, this Article reasons that actors must be
“authors” under American copyright law—any other conclusion would be
counter to basic principles of American copyright law.
Part I of this Article reviews the framework of international legal norms
in which American copyright law exists, setting out how actors may be
“authors” as international copyright law understands that concept. Part II
then takes up the glimmers of law and commentary that address whether and
how dramatic performances attract copyright protection under American
copyright law. This evidence has been limited, but has consistently pointed
toward the conclusion that actors can be authors under American copyright
law. Part II also explores what happened on the actors-as-authors question
*
Honorable William Matthew Byrne, Jr. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount
University. My thanks to Robert Brauneis, Jay Dougherty, Kevin Collins, Jane Ginsburg, Paul Goldstein,
Jukka Liedes, Jessica Litman, Shira Perlmutter, and Robert Stoll for their helpful comments. Thanks to
William Bowen and Claudia Herrera for research assistance. The remaining errors are the exclusive
intellectual property of the author. Copyright © 2018 by the author. Permission is hereby granted for
noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part for educational or research purposes,
including the making of multiple copies for classroom use, subject only to the condition that the name of
the author, a complete citation to Connecticut Law Review, and this copyright notice and grant of
permission be included in the copies.
1
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., THE MAKING AVAILABLE RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2016).
2
F. Jay Dougherty, Not A Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S.
Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 300 (2001).
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in the 2015 Garcia v. Google decision, a litigation tale more of fraud and
fatwas than clear conclusions on copyright law. With Garcia v. Google
properly understood, Part III returns to the basic question and explores
whether and how dramatic performances attract copyright protection
through hypotheticals and views of the acting community. After a brief
review of the legal and customary filters that keep parties from litigating the
actor-as-author question, Part IV offers a discussion of joint authorship
doctrine as it should apply to actors in audiovisual works.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT LAW
American copyright law sits in the broader context of the international
copyright system and the international legal norms in intellectual property
to which the United States has agreed to be bound. Among the many
international treaties in intellectual property, three pertain to the rights of
dramatic performers in their performances.
A. The Open-Ended Framework of the Berne Convention
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works3
has been the central pillar of the international copyright system since at least
1988, when the United States finally ratified the Convention and effectively
ended competition between Berne and the Universal Copyright Convention
administered by UNESCO.4 Films were first included in Berne during the
1908 Berlin revision of the Convention, when it was agreed that
cinematographic works were to be treated as “literary or artistic works when
by the arrangement of the stage effects or by the combination of the incidents
represented, the author shall have given to the work a personal and original
character.”5 The position of audiovisual works in the Berne Convention was
strengthened in 1967 with the addition of Article 14bis which provides that:
(1) Without prejudice to the copyright in any work which may
have been adapted or reproduced, a cinematographic work
3

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at
Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 30
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
4
For background, see Leonard D. Duboff, et al., Out of UNESCO and into Berne: Has United
States Participation in the Berne Convention for International Copyright Protection Become Essential?,
4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 203, 213 (1985). See also Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never:
Implementation of the 1886 Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 176 (1989).
5
Convention Creating an International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
signed at Berlin, November 13, 1908, Art. 14, as reprinted in Library of Congress, Report of the Delegate
of the United States to the International Convention for the Revision of the Berne Copyright Convention
Held at Berlin, Germany, October 14 to November 14, 1908, Copyright Office Bulletin, No. 13 at 21
(1908) [hereinafter 1908 BERNE REVISION OF BERNE].
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shall be protected as an original work. The owner of copyright
in a cinematographic work shall enjoy the same rights as the
author of an original work, including the rights referred to in
the preceding Article.
(2)(a) Ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall
be a matter for legislation in the country where protection is
claimed.6
Article 14bis further provides a limited mechanism to consolidate the
rights of different contributors to an audiovisual work by providing that “in
the absence of any contrary or special stipulation” a contributor may not
object to the reproduction, distribution, public performance, or other
exploitation of the work.7 Article 14bis exempts from this mandatory
presumptive consolidation of economic rights the “principal director” as
well as the “authors of scenarios, dialogues and musical works created for
the making of the cinematographic work.”8
These elements suggest that the negotiators may have envisioned the
film director as the principal author, i.e. the originality is recognized in the
“arrangement of the stage effects” and “the combination of the incidents
represented” (although the former phrase could be interpreted other ways).9
By 1967 a film’s screenwriter and the composer of the soundtrack (the latter
not existing in 1908) seemed to have been placed on par or potential par with
the director. No mention is made of dramatic performers, meaning that if
dramatic performers are authors of cinematographic works, they would be
subject to the Article 14bis(2)(b) presumptive consolidation of economic
rights.
Many jurisdictions also designate potential types of authors of
audiovisual works. For example, France’s Intellectual Property Code
presumes that authors of an audiovisual work include the director, the author
of the script, the author of any adaptation, any separate author(s) of dialogue,
and composers of musical compositions created especially for the film.10

6

Berne Convention, supra note 3, at art. 14bis.
Id. at art. 14bis(2)(b) (“[I]n the countries of the [Berne] Union which, by legislation, include
among the owners of copyright in a cinematographic work authors who have brought contributions to
the making of the work, such authors, if they have undertaken to bring such contributions, may not, in
the absence of any contrary or special stipulation, object to the reproduction, distribution, public
performance, communication to the public by wire, broadcasting or any other communication to the
public, or to the subtitling or dubbing of texts, of the work.”).
8
See id. at art. 14bis(3) (noting that a Berne Convention country is still permitted to have a
presumption of consolidation of economic rights from these types of authors).
9
1908 BERNE REVISION OF BERNE, supra note 5. The French original for “stage effects” is “mise
en scène,” a far richer concept than carried by the English words.
10
CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.I.P.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L1137 (Fr.), available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/location/1742.
7
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German and Mexican law have similar provisions. China’s Copyright Law
of 2010 stipulates that ownership of a cinematographic work belongs to the
“the producer of the work” but then specifies that the authors of a
cinematographic work are its “scriptwriter, director, cameraman, lyricist,
composer, and other authors,”12 presumably ensuring that those individuals
enjoy the moral rights associated with the work under Chinese law.13
But the fact that neither the Berne Convention nor these other
jurisdictions mention actors as authors has little bearing on the question for
American copyright law. Indeed, the closest thing to an official commentary
on Berne Article 14bis recognizes that actors may be among the authors of
a cinematographic work. The 1978 World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection and Literary and
Artistic Works14 says that Article 14bis intends to draw a distinction between
the “principal director” along with contributors to a cinematographic work
“whose works (scenarios, scripts, music) can enjoy an existence other than
in the film itself” versus all other contributors to whom the presumption
applies.15 The 1978 WIPO Guide describes those other contributors as
“assistant producers and directors, those responsible for decor, costumiers,
cameramen and cutters, and also to the actors, to the extent that some
countries treat them as co-authors of the film.”16
The 1978 WIPO Guide is worded this way because most national laws
protecting dramatic performers do so through separate “neighboring
rights.”17 Simply put, these countries acknowledge the creative contribution
11

Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright
Act],
Sept.
9,
1965, BGBl I
at
art.
65
(Ger.),
https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html#p0688 (providing that in the case of jointly authored
works, “[c]opyright in cinematographic works and works produced in a manner similar to
cinematographic works expires 70 years after the death of the last surviving of the following person: the
principle film director, the author of the screenplay, the author of the dialogues, the composer of music
specifically composed for use in the cinematographic work in question.”); Ley Federal del Derecho de
Autor [LDFA], art. 97, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1996 (Mex.) [hereinafter LDFA],
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mx/mx003en.pdf.
12
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, (promulgated by Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress on Amending Copyright Law, Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991)
[hereinafter
2010
Copyright
Law
of
China],
art.
15,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn031en.pdf.
13
See id. at art. 10 (establishing rights of attribution and integrity); Seagull Haiyan Song, China’s
Copyright Protection for Audio-Visual Works – Comparison with Europe and the U.S., 46 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 410, 410–13 (2015) (comparing the Chinese, European, and United
States models of copyright protection for films).
14
Claude Masouyé, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC
WORKS
(PARIS
ACT,
1971),
[WIPO]
(1978),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/615/wipo_pub_615.pdf [hereinafter Masouyé].
15
Masouyé, supra note 14, ¶ 14bis14 at 89.
16
Id. ¶ 14bis15 at 89 (emphasis added).
17
E.g., LDFA, supra note 11, at arts. 116–22; 2010 Copyright Law of China, supra note 12, at art.
37.
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of dramatic performers with a different form of intellectual property rights.
In contrast, Canadian law provides a good example of a country that—per
the WIPO Guide—expressly provides copyright to audiovisual performers
for their performances. Section 2 of the Copyright Act of Canada defines a
“performer’s performance” in a way that includes performance of a
“dramatic work” and a “recitation or reading of a literary work”—even when
the underlying works are out of copyright.18 The Section 2 definition also
includes “an improvisation of a dramatic work . . . whether or not the
improvised work is based on a pre-existing work.”19 Among the provisions
extending copyright to “performer’s performances,” Section 15(2) restricts
some rights stemming from audiovisual performances to those performances
that “take place in Canada or in a Rome Convention country” while section
15(2.1) restricts other rights to performances that “take place in Canada.”20
But these elaborate provisions—and the narrower scope of audiovisual
performers’ copyright—reflect Canada’s current international obligation
under the Rome Convention and not a basic questioning of the notion that
actors’ dramatic performances may be protected under copyright.
B. From the 1961 Rome Convention to the 2012 Beijing Treaty
Separate from the Berne Convention, there are two multilateral treaties
directly bearing on dramatic performers’ rights: the 1961 Rome Convention
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations21 and the 2012 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual
Performances. Besides the Copyright Office’s Compendium (discussed
below), perhaps the greatest foray into the question of actors’ copyright
taken by executive and legislative branch officials has been the role of the
United States in negotiating the latter of these two instruments.22
18

Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42 (Can.) last amended June 19, 2017.
Id.
20
See id. § 15 (providing that although musical performer’s performances in “sound recordings”
receive wider protection, the Section 2 definition of sound recordings “excludes any soundtrack of a
cinematographic work where it accompanies the cinematographic work”). The Association of Canadian
Television and Radio Actors (ACTRA) takes the position that Canadian audiovisual performers are not
adequately protected. See Intellectual Property Rights for Performers, ACTRA, http://www.actra.ca/wpcontent/uploads/Intellectual-Property-Protection-Backgrounder-1.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2018)
(“Currently, only Canadian audio performers are protected under the Copyright Act, leaving audiovisual
performers’ moral and economic rights vulnerable to exploitation.”).
21
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
22
The author was a member of the U.S. delegation to the 2000 diplomatic conference discussed
here and head of the U.S. delegation to the 2012 diplomatic conference discussed; he was also chairman
of “Main Committee II” of the 2000 diplomatic conference. For confirming the discussion in these pages,
my thanks to Jukka Lieddes, Shira Perlmutter, and Robert L. Stoll. Jukka Liedes is a Finnish government
official who served as Chairman of “Main Committee 1” of both the 1996 and 2000 diplomatic
conferences. Email from Jukka Liedes to author (July 22, 2018) (on file with author). Shira Perlmutter
19
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While the Berne Convention leaves open the possibility that actors
might be joint authors of a film under a national copyright law, the 1961
Rome Convention was the first multilateral treaty to obligate contracting
parties to provide dramatic performers with copyright-like rights.23 Article
7 of the Rome Convention gives performers, including actors, rights to
control fixation and broadcasting of their performances as well as certain
reproductions of their fixed performances.24 But the Rome Convention then
provides—in an article specifically directed at “Performers’ Rights in
Films”—that “once a performer has consented to the incorporation of his
performance in a visual or audio-visual fixation, Article 7 shall have no
further application.”25 This provision, which has been transposed into many
national laws, has been criticized for substantially weakening whatever
protection the Rome Convention might have established. Although there are
over ninety countries that are contracting parties of the Rome Convention,
three of the most important audiovisual production countries—China, India,
and the United States—are not.26
After the completion of the WTO agreements27 in the early 1990s,
negotiations started on extensive revision of the Berne and Rome
Conventions to cover emerging digital and network issues. Some elements
of this ambitious agenda28 came to fruition in the WIPO Copyright Treaty
also participated in all three of the diplomatic conferences described here: in 1996 as head of the U.S.
Copyright Office’s Office of Policy and International Affairs; in 2000 as a representative of the
International Federation of the Phonographic Industries (IFPI); and in 2012 as head of the USPTO’s
Office of Policy and International Affairs. Email from Shira Perlmutter, Chief Policy Officer & Dir. for
Int’l Affairs, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to author (July 10, 2018) (on file with author). Robert
Stoll was head Office of Legislative and International Affairs, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, at the
time of the 2000 diplomatic conference. Email from Robert Stoll to author (Mar. 16, 2018) (on file with
author).
23
Rome Convention, supra note 21, at art. 7.
24
Id. at art. 7.
25
Id. at art. 19.
26
See
WIPO-Administered
Treaties,
WIPO
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=17 (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (noting that
India was an original signatory of the convention, but never ratified it). Other countries that are not bound
by the Rome Convention include Bangladesh, Botswana, Cambodia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Morocco,
Mali, Myanmar, Namibia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand. Id.
27
The WTO agreements include the TRIPS Agreement. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/anex1_e.pdf.
28
By August 1996, the WIPO’s Committee on Experts presented “Basic Proposals” for three new
substantive treaties:
1. ‘Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works’,
2. ‘Treaty for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers of
Phonograms’,
3. ‘Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases’.
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(WCT) and the WIPO Phonograms and Performances Treaty (WPPT), both
of which were finalized at a diplomatic conference in December 1996.29 The
WCT established new international legal norms for copyright concerning:
(a) separate, exclusive rights of distribution and communication;30 (b)
obligations on the protection of “rights management information”;31 and (c)
obligations vis-à-vis “technological measures” that copyright owners may
use in connection with the exclusive copyright rights.32 The WPPT provides
largely parallel developments for the rights of musical performers and
phonogram producers, while also giving musical performers a right of
fixation against unauthorized recordings.33
The 1996 Diplomatic Conference left two major agenda items
unresolved: (a) the extra copyright protection of collections of information;
and (b) the rights of audiovisual performers. The first of these, proposed by
the European Union,34 was left by the wayside in part because opposition

Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Basic Proposal
for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers
of Phonograms to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, ¶ 15, at 4, WIPO Doc. No. CRNR/DC/5
(Aug. 30, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_dc/crnr_dc_5.pdf; see
also Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Basic Proposal
for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, ¶15, at 4, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4
(Aug. 30, 1996), available at www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_dc/crnr_dc_4.pdf (proposing
the same three treaties).
29
WIPO, WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), Dec. 20, 1996 [hereinafter WCT], available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/wct/trt_wct_001en.pdf; WIPO, WIPO Performances and
Phonograms
Treaty,
Dec.
20,
1996
[hereinafter
WPPT],
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/wppt/trt_wppt_001en.pdf. Both were adopted by the
WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions in Geneva, on
December 20, 1996.
30
WCT, supra note 29, arts. 6, 8. Article 6 of the WCT is captioned “Right of Distribution” and
establishes a general “exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and
copies” of works. Id. at art. 6. Article 8 of the WCT is captioned “Right of Communication to the Public”
and establishes that authors shall enjoy an “exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their
works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them.” Id. at art. 8. This last phrase is intended to describe generally Internet
distribution and delivery, but the interconnection of the two Articles is clear in that Article 8 equates a
“making available to the public” via wire or wireless means as a “communication to the public.” Id.; see
also WPPT, supra note 29, at arts. 8, 10 (providing rights that parallel those in the WCT).
31
WCT, supra note 29, at art. 12.
32
Id. at art. 11.
33
WPPT, supra note 29, at art. 6(ii).
34
The European Union had promulgated a directive establishing sui generis protection of the
investment in collections of information. Directive 96/9, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20, ¶¶ 20–28.
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35

from the scientific and library communities made it impossible for the
United States to move forward on the topic.36
In contrast, there was sustained interest in—if not agreement about—the
protection of audiovisual performers.37 The 1996 Diplomatic Conference
had been unable to include audiovisual performers in the WPPT because the
American motion picture industry was concerned about both moral rights
for actors and guaranteeing international recognition of contractual
agreements that transfer actors’ economic rights to film producers.38 But
35
For samples of the criticism of the Database Directive during that period, see J.H. Reichman &
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997).
36
But for several years after, Congress entertained proposals for domestic laws providing sui
generis protection of non-creative databases under the Commerce Clause. See Justin Hughes, How ExtraCopyright Protection of Databases Can be Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159, 167–68 (2003)
(describing American attempts to establish similar protections during the second half of the 1990s).
Eventually that debate died out, partly because commercial business models based on distribution of
databases have largely been replaced by commercial business models based on information retrieval
services. When was the last time you saw a printed airline schedule booklet, used a newspaper’s movie
listings to determine what film you would see, or found a phone number with White Pages printed on
paper?
37
Seth Greenstein’s daily reports from the 1996 Diplomatic Conference provide some insight. See,
e.g., Seth Greenstein, Day Four -- Officers Selected, Opening Statements, WAYBACKMACHINE (Dec. 5,
1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065434/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-5.html. (“[In the opening
statement, t]he representative from Ireland spoke generally on behalf of the European Union countries.
He promoted a high level of protection also for audiovisual performers and producers . . . .”); Seth
Greenstein, Day Seven -- The AudioVisual Debate, and What's Fair is Fair Use, WAYBACKMACHINE
(Dec. 10, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065341/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-10.html
(detailing how the US delegation was showing willingness to accept economic rights if transfers of rights
were recognized); Seth Greenstein, Day Nine -- Champagne and Broken Glass, WAYBACKMACHINE
(Dec. 12, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065319/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-12.html (“[T]he
success of this treaty is threatened more by traditional disputes between the copyright and authors' right
systems -- should performers in audiovisual works obtain the same rights as producers? Would the United
States have to increase the limited scope of its performance right for sound recordings?”); Seth
Greenstein, Day Ten (and Eleven) -- Public Optimism, Private Meetings, WAYBACKMACHINE (Dec. 13–
14, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065301/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-13.html (“The EC and
United States had dedicated a good part of the day, and discussions into the evening, to the resolution of
the audiovisual dispute concerning performers' and producers' rights in audiovisual works.”); Seth
Greenstein, The Final Day -- Two Treaties for WIPO, and One More for the Road, WAYBACKMACHINE
(Dec. 20, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065207/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-20.html (writing
that the 1996 diplomatic conference ended with adoption of “the recommendation and resolution
regarding a new conference on audiovisual works and regarding future work on database protection”).
38
As characterized by one commentator, “[a]lthough the U.S. and European delegations were allied
on almost all other intellectual property issues at the diplomatic conference, they were bitterly divided
on a proposal to universalize European norms about rights of performers of audiovisual works which the
U.S. motion picture industry regarded as an anathema. After the Europeans finally agreed to put off to
another day the debate over international rights for audiovisual performers, the [WPPT] could be
finalized.” Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. I NT’L L. 369, 371–72 (1997)
(footnotes omitted). Only a few years before, the film producers had a bitter legislative fight in
Washington with film directors over moral rights. See David A. Honicky, Film Labelling as a Cure for
Colorization [and Other Alterations]: A Band-Aid for a Hatchet Job, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
409, 425, 427–28 (1994) (describing the fight between Congress and film producers over the 1992
proposed Film Disclosure Act).
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even when the Diplomatic Conference reached an impasse on these issues,
the United States did not take the position that American actors lacked rights
under existing U.S. law.
Gaining international recognition of actors’ rights was important to the
unions representing American actors, the Screen Actors Guild and the
American Federation of Television and Radio Actors. Because the
audiovisual producers must engage in intermittent collective bargaining with
these unions, the film studios decided to support the actors’ position, as long
as the “transfer of rights” issue could be addressed successfully and any
moral rights provision would permit normal film editing and marketing
practices. This allowed the United States to engage fully in the audiovisual
performance discussions that continued after 1996 in WIPO’s Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights.39 Successive American
administrations negotiated on the assumption that American copyright law
provided the possibility that an actor could be an author of an audiovisual
work, such that no additional rights would need to be added to the copyright
system. This was similar to how the assumption that a musician could be an
author of a sound recording under American law undergirded American
willingness to negotiate and enter the WPPT.
The audiovisual negotiations intensified in the late 1990s40 and seemed
to bring WIPO closer to the finish line—close enough to convene another
39

This included making a complete treaty proposal in late 1999. See WIPO Standing Committee
on Copyright and Related Rights, Third Session, Agenda Item 4: Protection of Audiovisual
Performances: Submission of the United States of America, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/3/7 (Nov. 3,
1999), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_3/sccr_3_7.pdf (announcing that the United
States would subsequently support further advancement of audiovisual performers’ rights).
40
See, e.g., Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, First Session, Agenda Item 5:
Protection of Audiovisual Performances: Submission Received from Member States of WIPO by
September 30, 1998, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/1/4 (Oct. 1, 1998), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_1/sccr_1_4.pdf (documenting proposals from
Japan and the United States, along with a report from Latin American countries); WIPO Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, First Session, Agenda Item 5: Protection of Audiovisual
Performances: Submission of Canada, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/1/8 (Nov. 12, 1998), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_1/sccr_1_8.pdf (noting Canada’s objections to
legislation that would allow for a deemed or presumed transfer of rights); WIPO Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights, Second Session, Agenda Item 4: Protection of Audiovisual Performances:
Comparative Table of Proposals Received by February 28, 1999, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/2/4,
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_2/sccr_2_4.pdf (detailing proposals by
15 African countries, Canada, the European Union, and Korea); WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright
and Related Rights, Third Session, Agenda Item 4: Protection of Audiovisual Performances: Additional
Proposal of Japan Concerning Moral Rights, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/3/8 (Nov. 10, 1999) (footnote
omitted),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_3/sccr_3_8.pdf
(documenting a proposal from Japan on the moral rights of performers); WIPO Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights, Third Session, Agenda Item 4: Protection of Audiovisual Performances:
Submission of Canada, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/3/9 (Nov. 11, 1999) (footnote omitted), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_3/sccr_3_9.pdf (presenting a proposal from Canada
for uniform rules for recognizing the transfer of rights).
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diplomatic conference in December 2000 dedicated exclusively to
audiovisual performances. This 2000 “dipcon” found a formula to overcome
film producers’ concerns over possible moral rights claims via an agreed
statement that “modifications of a performance that are made in the normal
course of exploitation of the performance, such as editing, compression,
dubbing, or formatting, in existing or new media or formats” would not be
considered violations of the new moral rights provision.41 In international
law, such agreed statements should be given a central role in the
interpretation of any ambiguities in a treaty’s provisions.42
Yet while overcoming film producers’ hesitation about moral rights, the
2000 Diplomatic Conference was unable to craft legal norms that would
apply comfortably to both continental European and American film
production systems, especially to give security to contractual transfers of
economic rights from actors to film producers. This “consolidation of rights”
issue caused the meeting to end in a stalemate: the United States, supported
by India, insisted on a “transfer of rights” provision that would ensure major
film producers could distribute their films globally while the European
Union opposed all proposals for such a provision.43
41

WIPO, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, June 24, 2012, at n. 5 [hereinafter Beijing
Treaty] (“For the purposes of this Treaty and without prejudice to any other treaty, it is understood that,
considering the nature of audiovisual fixations and their production and distribution, modifications of a
performance that are made in the normal course of exploitation of the performance, such as editing,
compression, dubbing, or formatting, in existing or new media or formats, and that are made in the course
of a use authorized by the performer, would not in themselves amount to modifications within the
meaning of Article 5(1)(ii). Rights under Article 5(1)(ii) are concerned only with changes that are
objectively prejudicial to the performer’s reputation in a substantial way. It is also understood that the
mere use of new or changed technology or media, as such, does not amount to modification within the
meaning of Article 5(1)(ii).”). All elements in the 2012 Beijing Treaty, with the exception of Article 12,
were completed in 2000. The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances – An EIFL Briefing for
Libraries, EIFL (June 2013), http://www.eifl.net/resources/beijing-treaty-audiovisual-performanceseifl-briefing-libraries.
42
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such an “agreed statement” almost
certainly constitutes an “agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
conne[c]tion with the conclusion of the treaty” which is part of the context used for primary interpretation
of any treaty provision. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
art. 31(2)(a) at 340.
43
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF THE 2012 WIPO
AUDIOVISUAL PERFORMANCES TREATY, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter Obama Administration, Background
and
Summary
of
Beijing],
available
at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/WIPO_AVP_TREATY_FACT_SHEET.pdf (“The U.S.,
supported by India, insisted on a ‘transfer of rights’ provision that major film producers felt was needed
to ensure their ability to distribute films globally; the European Union opposed all proposals for such a
provision.”); The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, Done at Beijing on June 24, 2012,
February 10, 2016, S. Treaty Doc. No. 114-8, V–VI [hereinafter 2016 Transmittal Letter] (“Countries
narrowed the gaps at a diplomatic conference in 2000, but deadlocked over the issue of how performers
could transfer to producers, by contract or otherwise, their exclusive rights regarding the uses of their
performances.”); see also Deming Liu, The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (2012), in
WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 25.03 (Trevor Cook ed., 4th ed. 2015) (describing how Article 12 on transfer
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Following this inconclusive conclusion—so inconclusive that the
diplomatic conference was adjourned, not closed—everyone involved in the
negotiations understood that until there was a consensus on transfer of rights,
the treaty could not be completed. For the next decade, further discussions
were effectively pro forma.44 In 2010–2011, those negotiations were taken
up again by the Obama Administration and the prior impasse was broken
with compromise language initially drafted by India, Mexico, and the United
States, which was then supported by the European Union, Brazil, and
Nigeria.45 Based on that language, the WIPO members convened a
diplomatic conference in Beijing46 and completed what is now known as the
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances.47
The Beijing Treaty establishes for dramatic performers the same rights
to their performances in audiovisual works that musicians have to their
performances in sound recordings under the 1996 WPPT, ratified by the
United States in 1998. A 2012 Administration document48 described the
government’s view of the compatibility of the treaty with current U.S. law
as follows:
•

Under U.S. law, actors and musicians are considered to be
“authors” of their performances, providing them with
copyright rights.

•

Just as the rights established in U.S. law already provide
the protection for musical performers mandated by the

of rights “was agreed by consensus at the 22nd Session of the SCCR held in 2011, enshrining a
compromise designed to obtain the agreement of all concerned.”).
44
Obama Administration, Background and Summary of Beijing, supra note 43, at 1 (“For the next
decade, the incomplete AVP languished on the agenda of WIPO's Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights (SCCR).”).
45
Id. at 2 (“The United States, Mexico, and India delegations achieved compromise language,
working closely with the delegations of other major film-producing jurisdictions, particularly the EU,
Brazil, and Nigeria.”); Liu, supra note 43, at 25.03.
46
Obama Administration, Background and Summary of Beijing, supra note 43, at 2; see also David
Kappos, A Milestone In Protecting Creative Content Around the World, DIR.'S FORUM: A BLOG FROM
USPTO'S
LEADERSHIP
(June
26,
2012),
https://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/a_milestone_in_protecting_creative (“A breakthrough to the
stalemate occurred in 2010, when . . . [w]ith substantial input from the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), and the American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists (AFTRA), the United States submitted a proposal, and then worked with other delegations that
had submitted proposals (Mexico, India) as well as with delegations from other major film-producing
jurisdictions (particularly the European Union, Brazil and Nigeria) to find compromise language.”).
47
Beijing Treaty, supra note 41.
48
Obama Administration, Background and Summary of Beijing, supra note 43. Judges in the Ninth
Circuit characterized this document as a “USPTO” document when in fact the text was approved by an
inter-agency process that included the State Department, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the
Institute of Museums and Libraries, and the U.S. Copyright Office. In this sense, it is more accurately
characterized as an Administration document. The author of this Article was also the principal author of
the Administration document, reflecting the consensus views of the agencies above.
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WPPT, U.S. law is already generally compatible with the
Beijing Treaty provisions.
•

Nonetheless, implementation of the Beijing Treaty may
require some technical amendments of the Copyright Act,
in particular the Title 17 reference to existing international
copyright obligations, or “points of attachment” for parties
to this treaty under U.S. law.

•

If the negotiations are successful, then subject to
authorization by the Secretary of State and the
Administration, the Beijing Treaty—like the WCT and
WPPT—would be submitted for the advice and consent of
the Senate.49

While this 2012 Administration document refers to “technical
amendments,” a full implementation of the Beijing Treaty would require
express acknowledgement of one new right for actors: a right to prevent the
fixation of their performances.50 This right was established for musicians in
the 1990s in § 1101 of Title 17.51 The right was subsequently upheld in a
series of litigation testing its constitutionality.52 Whether or not extension of
this “right of fixation” to dramatic actors counts as a “technical amendment,”
it could be achieved through simple amendment of § 1101 and 18 U.S.C. §
2319A.53 And that is exactly what the Administration proposed in February
2016 when it sent the Beijing Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification.
Consistent with the view that American copyright law already offers
actors the possibility of being “authors,” the transmittal package from the
State Department to the Senate states that only “[n]arrow changes in U.S.
law will be needed for the United States to implement certain provisions of
the treaty,”54 and “[f]or the most part, existing U.S. law, principally the
49

Obama Administration, Background and Summary of Beijing, supra note 43, at 2.
Compare id. (“Nonetheless, implementation of the AVP may require some technical amendments
of the Copyright Act, in particular where Title 17 refers to existing international copyright obligations
(‘points of attachment’ for parties to this treaty under U.S. law).”), with Beijing Treaty, supra note 41, at
art. 7 (footnote omitted) (“Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the direct or indirect
reproduction of their performances fixed in audiovisual fixations, in any manner or form.”).
51
17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
52
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1036 (2000) (upholding the criminal provision against bootlegging, § 2319A, as an exercise of
Commerce Clause power); United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding the
criminal provision against bootlegging on the grounds that it is not a copyright law and there was “no
need to examine whether it violates limits of the Copyright Clause.”); KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport
Int’l Prods., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (upholding § 1101 as a constitutional exercise
of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause).
53
Justin Hughes, Understanding (and Fixing) the Right of Fixation in Copyright Law, 62 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 385, 388 (2015) [hereinafter Hughes, Right of Fixation].
54
2016 Transmittal Letter, supra note 43, at III.
50
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Copyright Act, would enable the United States to implement the obligations
of the Beijing Treaty.”55 The transmittal also states the Beijing Treaty:
[F]ills a gap in the international copyright system by extending
to such performers the type of protections previously accorded
to authors and to performers and producers of sound
recordings, pursuant to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party. The Treaty's framework is
consistent with existing U.S. standards[.]56
All of these statements could be interpreted as vague bureaucratese, but
the only statutory changes proposed by the Obama Administration were
changes to lists of treaties mentioned in Title 1757 and an amendment of §
1101 to give actors a right of fixation enforced by a civil cause of action.
The proposed amendment would do this by deleting the limiting words
“music” and “musical” from § 1101 and adding “images” to § 1101 along
with a § 101 definition.58 The only reasonable interpretation of the fact that
no other changes were proposed is that the consensus view of the experts in
the government was that actors already can be authors under the Copyright
Act—the same view as we will see is found in the Copyright Office’s
Compendium.
II. AMBIGUITY IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Copyright Office Compendium’s View
Lacking the clear statutory mandate of Canadian copyright law, what
evidence is there that American copyright law treats actors as authors?
Among statements from the executive and legislative branches,59 perhaps
55

Id. at VIII.
Id. at V.
57
Beijing Treaty Implementation Act of 2016, 114th Cong. (2016) available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Beijing-treaty-package.pdf (as transmitted from
Under Secretary of Commerce Michelle Lee to President of the Senate Joseph Biden, Feb. 26, 2016).
58
Id. at 2.
59
Housed in the Library of Congress, the question of whether the U.S. Copyright Office is an
Article I or Article II entity has been litigated inconclusively. Compare Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d
294, 301 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding Register of Copyrights to be executive branch officer), with United
States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that the Copyright Office is not in the
executive branch). In practice, the Copyright Office is only partially integrated into the executive
branch’s copyright policy apparatus. See also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and
Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 764
(2001) (describing Copyright Office as “strictly part of the legislative branch”); Andy Gass, Considering
Copyright Rulemaking: The Constitutional Question, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1047, 1047 (2012); Justin
Hughes, Making Copyright Policy in Washington, THE HILL (Jan. 23, 2015, 12:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/the-administration/230449-making-copyright-policy-inwashington.
56
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the most explicit is the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practice,
which unequivocally recognizes the dramatic performance of actors as a
basis for authorship in an audiovisual work.60 Section 808.4 of the
Compendium identifies ten “Elements of Motion Picture Authorship” in the
following order: production, direction, cinematography, performance,
animation, screenplay or script, works that precede a screenplay or script,
editing, musical score, and soundtrack.61 The Compendium then defines
performance: “Performance refers to the acting, speaking, singing, or
dancing in a motion picture.”62 And the Compendium makes clear that
“motion pictures” encompasses all audiovisual works.63
In other words, the Compendium recognizes that dramatic performances
are protectable expression that is a basis for authorship in audiovisual works.
That is not the same thing as saying that dramatic performances are
protectable works, although under some circumstances—as explored in Part
III—that might be the case. Oddly, in the Garcia v. Google litigation, the
courts discussed and debated a letter from the Copyright Office and a fact
sheet from the Obama Administration, but there was complete silence vis-àvis the Copyright Office’s most comprehensive and authoritative statement
of what is protected by copyright in American law,64 despite the fact that at
least two amici briefs65—one discussed by the bench and counsel at oral
argument66—pointed the judges to the Compendium.
B. Views from the Bench
Opinions from the bench addressing copyright in dramatic performances
have been rare and sporadic, 67 but glimmers in the case law show courts
considering dramatic performances to be original expression providing a
60
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 307 (3d ed. 2014)
(rev. Sept. 29, 2017) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
61
Id. at § 808.4.
62
Id. at § 808.4(D).
63
Id. at § 808.5 (“Motion pictures include movies of all genres . . . [and] television programs and
commercials (e.g., comedy, drama, reality, news, advertisements), music and educational videos, and
short videos posted online.”).
64
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 751–52 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(Garcia III).
65
Brief for Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Garcia III, 786 F.3d 733 (No. 12-57302); Brief for Professors
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Justin Hughes, Peter Menell, & David Nimmer as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, Garcia III, 786 F.3d 733 (No. 12-57302) [hereinafter Balganesh et al. Brief].
66
Oral Argument at 49:30, Garcia III, 786 F.3d 733 (No. 12-57302),
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000006884 (discussing Balganesh et al.
Brief).
67
See Jacob M. Victor, Garcia v. Google and a “Related Rights” Alternative to Copyright in Acting
Performances, 124 YALE L.J.F. 80, 82 (2014) (“[C]ourts rarely have the opportunity to address the issue
of whether film actors maintain independent copyright interests in their performances.”).
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basis for authorship. Such comments have occurred in dicta or in holdings
that could be read in alternative ways, mainly in disputes in which a state
law claim brought by the plaintiff is precluded by a dramatic performance
being in the realm of federal copyright.
An early example—and one that is understandably criticized—is the
Seventh Circuit’s 1986 decision in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Players’ Association.68 In that case, the players’ association
claimed that live telecasts of major league baseball (MLB) games violated
the players’ individual rights of publicity.69 Both the district court and the
appellate panel concluded that MLB ownership of the copyright in the
baseball telecasts preempted any right of publicity claims under state law.70
Copyright experts would agree with the conclusion of the Baltimore
Orioles court that the telecasts were copyrighted works based on the
originality of the camera people and director, as well as the simultaneous
fixation of the telecasts.71 But in an extended footnote, the appellate court
went on to conclude that the players’ performances while playing baseball
had sufficient originality to be protected by copyright once fixed in a
tangible medium:
The Players argue that their performances are not
copyrightable works because they lack sufficient artistic merit.
We disagree. Only a modicum of creativity is required for a
work to be copyrightable . . . . A recording of a performance
generally includes creative contributions by both the director
and other individuals responsible for recording the
performance and by the performers whose performance is
captured . . . . Judged by the above standard, the Players’
performances possess the modest creativity required for
copyrightability. 72
Further in the opinion, the appellate panel doubled down on this footnote
analysis. The Players’ Association argued that by asserting publicity rights
in their performances, “the works in which they assert rights are not fixed in
tangible form, their rights of publicity in their performances are not subject

68

Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 681.
70
Id. at 676.
71
Id. at 668–69 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1985), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5665) ( “When a football game is being covered by four television cameras, with a director guiding
the activities of the four cameramen and choosing which of their electronic images are sent to the public
and in which order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing constitutes
‘authorship.’”); id. at 669 n.7 (“[T]he Players agree that the cameramen and director contribute creative
labor to the telecasts.”).
72
Id. at 669, n.7.
69
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73

to preemption.” The panel met this head-on with reasoning that can be
interpreted as saying that an individual athlete’s performances would be
protected under copyright:
The Players’ performances are embodied in a copy, viz, the
videotape of the telecast, from which the performances can be
perceived, reproduced, and otherwise communicated
indefinitely. Hence, their performances are fixed in tangible
form, and any property rights in the performances that are
equivalent to any of the rights encompassed in a copyright are
preempted. 74
This conclusion as to the copyrightability of sports performances may
be problematic, principally on the grounds that playing a game is not
“expressive” in the sense that the concept is used in copyright doctrine75—
the appellate court was itself aware of this issue.76 But that wrinkle would
disappear if “Players” in this passage is read as theatrical players, not sports
players.
Of course, the fact that federal copyright preempts state law protection
of X does not mean that federal copyright protects X. But the Baltimore
Orioles panel and a subsequent Central District of California decision
concluded that “[o]nce a performance is reduced to tangible form, there is
no distinction between the performance and the recording of the
performance for purposes of preemption under § 301(a).”77 This warrants
some parsing.
73

Id. at 675.
Id.
75
See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“[B]asketball games do not fall within the subject matter of federal copyright protection because they
do not constitute ‘original works of authorship’ under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).”). But Paul Goldstein has
defended the possibility of copyright in the movements of sports players. See infra notes 184–87 and
accompanying text. The Baltimore Orioles panel’s approach can also be criticized on the grounds that
they reasoned that the performances have great commercial value and, citing Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), that courts “should not gainsay the copyrightability of a work
possessing great commercial value simply because the work’s aesthetic or educational value is not readily
apparent to a person trained in the law.” Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669 n.7. Not everyone is happy
with that thread drawn from Bleistein. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic
Progress, and the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2017) (reasoning that
Holmes used “personality” as the threshold for originality and—regrettably—commercial value as the
threshold for “progress”).
76
The court reiterated that its conclusion on the copyrightability of the telecasts and, therefore, the
preemption of the right of publicity claim, would hold regardless of originality in the athletic
performances. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d. at 676 (“Regardless of the creativity of the Players’
performances, the works in which they assert rights are copyrightable works which come within the scope
of § 301(a) because of the creative contributions of the individuals responsible for recording the Players’
performances.”).
77
Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675; Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1424
(C.D. Cal. 1994).
74
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The “recording of a performance” would normally be considered a
“work.” And to the degree that the recording of the performance captures
other things—costumes, sets, lighting, camera angles, and equipment
choices—there would be a distinction between a “recording of the
performance” and the recorded performance. But if we could eliminate those
other things—as discussed in Part III.A—it actually might be the case that
there would be little or “no distinction between the performance and the
recording of the performance.”
Two more preemption cases went further in this direction of finding that
a performance, once recorded, can be a copyrightable work. In a 1996
California state court case, Fleet v. CBS, Inc.,78 the court considered a
compensation dispute between producers of the film White Dragon and
some of the films’ actors. Because there was no question that CBS owned
the copyright in White Dragon, the plaintiffs alleged that CBS “did not have
permission to utilize their names, pictures, or likenesses in conjunction with
any exploitation of the film.” 79
The court concluded that section 301 of the Copyright Act preempted
the plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims.80 While agreeing that California’s
Civil Code section 3344 was “intended to protect rights which cannot be
copyrighted,” 81 the court concluded that the actors’ claim “crumbles in the
face of one obvious fact: their individual performances in the film White
Dragon were copyrightable.”82 Squarely answering the actors-as-authors
issue, the court concluded that once the “performances were put on film,
they became ‘dramatic work[s]’ [that were] ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression’”83 and that upon fixation, “the performances came within the
scope or subject matter of copyright law protection.”84 Strictly speaking, this
reasoning was not necessary to the preemption outcome. The court could
have concluded that the right of publicity claims were simply preempted
because the claims sought “only to prevent CBS from reproducing and
distributing” the copyrighted film.85 But the reasoning that “performances,”
once fixed, became “dramatic works” was certainly what CBS had
vigorously argued.86
78

58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. CBS released the film anyway and included a picture of one of the plaintiffs “on the packaging
and [in] advertising materials.” Id.
80
Id. at 649.
81
Id. at 650.
82
Id.
83
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Brief for Respondent at 7, Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (1996) (No. BC 092926)
(“[T]he performances in the Motion Picture . . . are works of authorship subject to copyright.”); see also
id. at 10 (“[T]he subject matters of appellants’ claims (their performance in a Motion Picture) are ‘works
of authorship’ fixed in a ‘tangible medium . . . .’”); id. at 13–14 (“All commentators and case authority
79
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Following Fleet v. CBS, Inc., a Ninth Circuit panel reached a similar
outcome in a similar fact pattern, but with less definitive language. In the
2010 Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc.87 litigation,
pornographic actor Jules Jordan and his one-man company brought an action
against parties who were clearly pirating Jordan’s adult films. A jury found
for Jordan on both copyright infringement and right of publicity claims,88
but the court granted the defendants’ motion for directed verdict on the
grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the copyright claims.89
This left the plaintiff with the successful California right of publicity claim,
and the defendants then appealed on the grounds that the right of publicity
claim was preempted by federal copyright law.90
Jordan’s state right of public claim was based on misappropriation of his
name, his “persona,” and his “dramatic performance.”91 The court concluded
that the claimed misappropriation of Jordan’s name and persona were “based
entirely on the misappropriation of the DVDs and [Jordan’s] performance
therein,”92 reducing the right of publicity claim to a claim of misappropriated
dramatic performance. As to preemption by federal copyright, the panel
reasoned:
Whether a claim is preempted under Section 301 does not turn
on what rights the alleged infringer possesses, but on whether
the rights asserted by the plaintiff are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of the copyright. The
question is whether the rights are works of authorship fixed in
a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of the Copyright Act. If a plaintiff asserts a claim that
is the equivalent of a claim for infringement of a copyrightable
work, that claim is preempted . . . .93
On this basis, the panel concluded that Jordan’s right of publicity claims
were preempted.94 Strictly speaking, the Jules Jordan court only concluded
agree that an actors’ performance in a film has the requisite degree of artistic creativity to be a work
protected by copyright law.”).
87
617 F.3d 1146, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2010).
88
Id. at 1151.
89
Id. at 1152 (“The court granted defendants’ motion, concluding that because Gasper was
employed by JJV the motion picture[s] were works for hire under 17 U.S.C. § 101 and that JJV was the
author, leaving Gasper without standing. The court also concluded that because the copyright registration
in Gasper’s name was invalid, JJV had no standing.”).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1153.
92
Id.; see also id. at 1154 (“[T]hroughout the litigation Gasper has claimed that the factual basis of
his right of publicity claim was the unauthorized reproduction of his performance on the DVDs.”).
93
Id. at 1154–55 (emphasis added).
94
Id. at 1155. While finding that the California right of publicity was preempted, the appellate court
reinstated the jury’s copyright infringement judgment against the defendants. Id. at 1160.
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that the rights Jordan asserted under California law over his recorded
performances were “equivalent to the rights contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106,
which articulates the exclusive rights of copyright holders.”95 This is not
precisely the Fleet court holding that when dramatic “performances were put
on film, they became ‘dramatic work[s]’ ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression.’”96 But it seems close.
Finally, two additional federal court decisions before the Garcia v.
Google litigation merit discussion. In the 2007 Richlin v. Metro-GoldwynMayer97 case, a Ninth Circuit panel was faced with the claim that joint
authorship in a movie treatment gave rise to joint authorship in the resulting
film. Pushing back against this claim, the panel expressly gave the lead
actor’s acting—“Peter Sellers’s legendary comedic performance”—as an
example of a legitimate basis for joint authorship on par with the film
director.98
The same year as Richlin, the federal district court in Puerto Rico
considered a copycat television show dispute between two television
stations, TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broadcasting.99 From 1997 to 1999,
TMTV produced and broadcasted a show called “20 Pisos de Historia.”100 A
year after “20 Pisos” went off the air, a competitor station began airing a
weekly sitcom called “El Condominio.”101 Many of the actors appearing in
“El Condominio” had played the same or similar characters in “20 Pisos.”102
When a dispute arose between the television stations, these “El
Condominio” actors sued TMTV “for declaratory judgment of ownership
over the copyrights to the characters they portray in that series,”103 while
TMTV counterclaimed on the basis that it owned “20 Pisos” and the
characters therein.104
Against the actors’ claim that they, not TMTV, owned the characters
created in “20 Pisos,” TMTV argued “that the actors cannot hold the
copyright to the characters, because they did not write the scripts in which
[the characters] appear.”105 The district court denied TMTV summary
95
Id. at 1153 (emphasis added) (quoting Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138
(9th Cir. 2006)).
96
Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
97
531 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 2007).
98
See id. at 970 (explaining the potential bases for co-authorship in the Pink Panther film were
“Peter Sellers’s legendary comedic performance, Henry Mancini’s memorable score, or Blake Edwards’s
award-winning direction”).
99
TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 (D.P.R. 2007).
100
Id. “20 Pisos” means “20 floors”—as in a tall apartment building—while “de Historia” could be
a play on words, meaning both “of history” and “of stories.”
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 236.
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judgment on this basis “because it is evident from the record that the actors
portrayed the characters in an audiovisual media, which permits a reasonable
inference that the actors’ contribution to the characters rendered them
authors.”106 A reasonable reading of this passage is that the court viewed the
final characters—as seen in the recorded television shows—as a composite
of what had been written in the script and original expression contributed by
the actors in the course of their recorded performances.
Along with the Copyright Office Compendium, this case law was largely
ignored by the various opinions that issued in the Garcia v. Google
litigation, a fact pattern incredible by even the standards of Hollywood.
C. The Strange and Strained Saga of Garcia v. Google
In bare-bone form, Cindy Lee Garcia was a struggling actor who
believed that she had been hired to perform in a low-budget film tentatively
entitled Desert Warrior. Film projects often change titles and scripts after
casts are hired, but Mark Basseley Youssef, the producer who hired Garcia
for the film, may never have intended to make the work he represented to
the cast and crew.107 What we know for sure is that Youssef used Garcia’s
short performance—with at least partial dubbing over her voice—in
Innocence of Muslims, a bizarre extended trailer that appeared on YouTube
in the summer of 2012.108 The fourteen-minute video seemed designed to
offend Muslims109 and Garcia’s very brief appearance in the video garnered
her multiple death threats, some based on a fatwa that all involved should
die.110
Garcia sought a preliminary injunction to have the video taken down
from YouTube,111 with her lawyer seeming to claim a copyright in Garcia’s
106

Id.
See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2014), dissolved by, 786 F.3d 733 (9th
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“This is a troubling case. Garcia was duped into providing an artistic performance
that was used in a way she never could have foreseen. Her unwitting and unwilling inclusion in
‘Innocence of Muslims’ led to serious threats against her life.”).
108
See Brooks Barnes, YouTube Wrongly Forced to Remove Anti-Muslim Movie Trailer, Appeals
TIMES
(May
18,
2015),
Court
Rules,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/business/media/youtube-wrongly-forced-to-remove-anti-muslimmovie-trailer-appeals-court-rules.html (describing the film and Garcia’s role).
109
See id. (noting the film’s depiction of the Prophet Muhammad “as a bloodthirsty thug”).
110
See Andrew Blankstein & Ned Parker, Police Probe Threats, Fatwa Against ‘Innocence of
TIMES:
L.A.
NOW
(Sept.
21,
2012,
7:17
AM),
Muslims’
Actors,
L.A.
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/09/police-probe-threats-fatwa-against-innocence-ofmuslims-actors.html (describing the fatwa issued by an Egyptian cleric against all associated with the
film); Jane C. Ginsburg, Actors as Authors?, MEDIA INST. (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/120114.php (“For her unwitting participation, Garcia received
death threats and sought without success to have the film removed from YouTube.”).
111
Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV 12-08315-MWF, 2012 WL 12878355, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30,
2012), aff’d sub nom. en banc, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). Garcia initially
107
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performance. This posture was clearly a matter of litigation strategy. First,
Garcia could not credibly argue that she was the sole author of the entire
video. Second, the legal conclusion that she was a joint author of the video
would mean that any other joint author could authorize distribution of the
video—as Youssef did—and Garcia would only be entitled to a financial
accounting.113 A claim of joint authorship would not only fail to lead to the
relief she wanted, it also would have been inconsistent with Garcia’s
allegation that she had been duped into participating in the video. In other
words, how could she contend that she had the intention to be a joint author
of a work in circumstances in which she alleged to have been defrauded as
to the nature of the work?
Given this dilemma, Garcia’s counsel “argue[d] only that she owns the
copyright in her performance within the Film.”114 The district court was
unconvinced that Garcia had a likelihood of success on the merits,115 and in
November 2012, the court declined to grant Garcia a temporary
injunction.116 From there, the case moved to the Ninth Circuit.117
In February 2014, a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district
court, issuing a slightly amended opinion a few months later. Writing for the
majority, Chief Judge Kozinski found that Garcia “likely has an independent
[copyright] interest in her performance,”118 that she had not transferred or
licensed those rights to Youssef, and that an injunction was warranted.
Garcia’s allegations that she had been defrauded as to the nature of the
video/film was a keystone of this reasoning. Because of Youssef’s
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the nature of the film, Garcia could not
have impliedly licensed use of her performance, 119 and there was neither an
employment situation nor a signed writing on which to base a conclusion
that her performance was a work-for-hire.120
Judge N.R. Smith dissented from Kozinski’s ruling, reasoning that
“Garcia does not clearly have a copyright interest in her acting performance,
requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) against YouTube, that request was denied, and the TRO
“[a]pplication was construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id.
112
Garcia, 2012 WL 12878355, at *2.
113
Id.
114
Id. (“Garcia does not argue that she is the sole author of the Film, nor does she argue that the
Film was a joint work of which she was a co-author.”).
115
Id. at *1 (“Nor has Garcia established a likelihood of success on the merits. Even assuming both
that Garcia’s individual performance in the Film is copyrightable and that she has not released this
copyright interest, the nature of this copyright interest is not clear.”).
116
Id.
117
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), dissolved by, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015)
(en banc).
118
Id. at 933. But oddly by injunctive relief standards, Judge Kozinski recognized that Garcia’s
claim was “fairly debatable.” Id. at 935.
119
Id. at 937–38.
120
Id. at 936–37.
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because (1) her acting performance is not a work, (2) she is not an author,
and (3) her acting performance is too personal to be fixed.”121 It is worth
considering these points in reverse order.
Judge Smith seems to have gotten the notion that an “acting performance
is too personal to be fixed” from a misreading of the Ninth Circuit’s 1988
case Midler v. Ford Motor Co.122 In that litigation, Ford had obtained a
license to use the musical composition “Do You Want to Dance” in a
commercial. When Bette Midler rebuffed Ford’s offer to do the commercial,
Ford “studiously acquire[d] the services of a sound-alike and instruct[ed] her
to imitate . . . Midler's voice.”123 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Midler’s
California law “sound-alike” claim was not preempted by federal copyright
law, offering that “[a] voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’
What is put forward . . . here is more personal than any work of
authorship.”124 Judge Smith misunderstood this statement, morphing it into
the conclusion that “Ninth Circuit precedent dictates that a vocalist’s singing
of the song is not copyrightable.”125 The dissent then applied that
misunderstanding of Midler to Garcia, concluding that “one actress’s
individual acting performance in the movie, like a vocalist singing a song,
‘is more personal than any work of authorship.’ As a result, it is not fixed.”126
This profoundly misunderstands the Midler case because Bette Midler
was not suing on a particular fixation of her singing—that is, any particular
sound recording. Midler could not bring such a suit under the Copyright Act
because under § 114, the derivative work right in sound recordings “is
limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds
fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in
sequence or quality.”127 In other words, the statute bars a “sound-alike”
claim based on a copyrighted sound recording. Instead, Midler claimed that
her vocal characteristics and style had been slavishly copied in a violation
121

Id. at 941 (Smith, J., dissenting).
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
123
Id. at 463.
124
Id.
125
Garcia, 766 F.3d at 945 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 462).
126
Id. (citation omitted). Of course, the idea that something is “too personal” to be a work of
authorship is arguably at odds with Justice Holmes’ equation of personal expression with original
expression. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“Personality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright
unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.”). While courts have not questioned Holmes’
statement, scholars have pondered its meaning. See Beebe, supra note 75, at 330 (reasoning that Holmes
used “personality” as the threshold for originality driven by an “everyman”—distinctively American
romanticism); Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—Photograph as Art, Photograph as
Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 369 (2012) (discussing Justice Holmes’s use of “personality” as
both a synonym and source of originality).
127
17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012).
122
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of her common law right of publicity. The case does not hold that “a
vocalist’s singing of [a] song is not copyrightable” because Midler was not
suing on the basis of any fixed sound recording.128 Indeed, a vocalist’s
singing of a song is copyrightable, even if there is no instrumental
accompaniment, no sound engineering, and no post-production. Cindy
Garcia was suing on reproduction of her own performance, not a “lookalike” or “act-alike.” While Judge Smith’s peculiar analysis did not survive
in the en banc decision, it may have influenced the en banc majority’s own
distorted statements on fixation, described below.
The dissent’s second critique of Garcia’s claim was simply that she was
“not an author.”129 This assertion was based on the Ninth Circuit’s 2000
Aalmuhammed v. Lee130 decision and its framework for distinguishing joint
authors from other contributors. In Aalmuhammed, a Ninth Circuit panel
denied joint authorship to a consultant on the film Malcolm X who had
“suggested extensive script revisions,” principally “to ensure the religious
and historical accuracy and authenticity of scenes depicting Malcolm X’s
religious conversion and pilgrimage to Mecca.”131 Judge Smith cited a series
of Aalmuhammed indicia to establish that Garcia could not be an author: (a)
an author is “the originator or the person who causes something to come into
being”;132 (b) an author is the “person with creative control”;133 (c) an author
is “he to whom anything owes its origin”;134 and (d) “an author might also
be ‘the invent[or] or master mind’ who ‘creates or gives effect to the
idea.’”135 Part IV will address the problems with Aalmuhammed. Suffice
here to say that by some of these tests, an actor will be an author—the actor
is certainly the performing artist that “causes something to come into being”
and the actor certainly “give[s] effect to the idea[s]” of the scriptwriter and
the director. These notions are explored further in Part III.B. In a footnote,
Judge Smith seems to recognize that Garcia might be a joint author with
Youssef,136 suggesting that the dissent was really using these tests to argue
that Garcia could not be the exclusive author of anything, a required basis
for her claimed injunctive relief.

128

Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
Garcia, 766 F.3d at 941 (Smith, J., dissenting).
130
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
131
Id. at 1230.
132
Garcia, 766 F.3d at 942 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232).
133
Id.
134
Id. (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233).
135
Id. (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234).
136
Id. at 942 n.3 (“Garcia’s interest in her acting performance may best be analyzed as a joint work
with Youssef, considering she relied on Youssef’s script, equipment, and direction.”); see also id. (citing
17 U.S.C. § 101) (defining “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole”).
129
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Finally, there is Judge Smith’s first concern about Garcia’s claim: that
“her acting performance [was] not a work” and that “[t]o be protected,
Garcia’s acting performance must be a ‘work.’”137 This is a legitimate issue
and arguably the most vexing problem in the Garcia litigation, but again the
analysis quickly went off the doctrinal rails. After reciting § 102(b), which
bars copyright protection of ideas, processes, methods of operation, and
discoveries,138 the dissent reasoned that an acting performance resembles the
“procedure” or “process” by which “an original work” is performed.
Therefore, “[i]n no case does copyright protection” extend to an acting
performance, “regardless of the form in which it is described, illustrated, or
embodied in” the original work.139
It is not clear what it means to say that a dramatic or musical
performance would “resemble” a “procedure” or “process,” except as a
misunderstanding of these latter two terms. What would it mean to say that
Nina Simone’s recorded performance and David Bowie’s separate recorded
performance of the musical composition Wild is the Wind were each a
“procedure” or “process”? A “procedure” or “process” of that musical
composition? If we could make any sense of this view, it would likely
undermine copyright protection of sound recordings. There was thankfully
no trace of this bizarre characterization of performances140 in the subsequent
en banc ruling.
Doctrinal missteps aside, we could describe the disagreement between
Judge Kozinski and Judge Smith as David Nimmer does: “The flash-point
between the majority and dissent focused on whether the plaintiff could
show copyright ownership.”141 To refine this, the plaintiff needed to show
exclusive ownership of something protected by copyright. As the subjects of
protection in American copyright law are “works of authorship,” we are
inevitably drawn to the question of whether a dramatic performance could
be a “work” under Title 17. If not, how could there be a protectable interest
controlled exclusively by the plaintiff? Concerning these questions, Jane
Ginsburg has noted that Judge Kozinski’s opinion stood “for the proposition

137

Id. at 941.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”).
139
Garcia, 766 F.3d at 942 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
140
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12(B)(2) (2018)
[hereinafter NIMMER & NIMMER] (“[Such a] construction does violence to the structure of the
[Copyright] Act. Congress expressly disallowed protection for various productions, such as methods of
operation and ideas. Those matters stand poles apart from performances, which constitute the essence of
works that Congress expressly embraced within the realm of copyright . . . .”).
141
David Nimmer, Innocence of Copyright: An Inquiry into the Public Interest, 63 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 367, 396 (2016).
138
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that audiovisual performances could be the subject matter of individual
copyrights owned by the individual actor.”142
Criticism of Judge Kozinski’s opinion was fast and furious, particularly
from those who generally oppose recognition of copyright rights.143 A
petition for re-hearing en banc was filed and granted on November 12,
2014.144 The case was reargued in December 2014 before eleven of the
twenty-two active judges on the Ninth Circuit,145 with an en banc decision
issued the following May.
Writing for the en banc majority, Judge McKeown concluded that the
law and facts did not favor “Garcia’s claim to a copyright in her five-second
acting performance as it appears in Innocence of Muslims.”146 Later, in the
discussion of the standards for injunctive relief, the majority opinion
describes Garcia’s claims as “based upon a dubious and unprecedented
theory of copyright.”147 McKeown’s opinion for the majority gives us some
distinct and separate reasons for these conclusions.
First, while the Garcia en banc opinion did not repeat Judge Smith’s
“acting performance is too personal to be fixed” argument, it did offer its
142

Ginsburg, supra note 110.
See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Copyright Ruling in US May Impair Free Speech, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (Apr. 14, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/historical/689/ (“[T]he ruling
significantly alters US law in a manner that will greatly restrict free speech.”); Mike Masnick, Horrific
Appeals Court Ruling Says Actress Has Copyright Interest In 'Innocence Of Muslims,' Orders YouTube
(Feb.
26,
2014,
12:29
PM),
To
Delete
Every
Copy,
TECHDIRT
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140226/12103626359/horrific-appeals-court-ruling-says-actresshas-copyright-interest-innocence-muslims-orders-youtube-to-delete-every-copy.shtml
(“Almost
everything about Kozinski's ruling here is troubling. The copyright interpretation just seems very far out
of bounds with just about everything having to do with copyright law.”); Venkat Balasubramani, In Its
“Innocence of Muslims” Ruling, the Ninth Circuit is Guilty of Judicial Activism—Garcia v. Google,
TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/02/in-itsinnocence-of-muslims-ruling-the-ninth-circuit-is-guilty-of-judicial-activism-garcia-v-google.htm
(“This starts to look . . . like a variation on the heckler’s veto. It’s certainly not very speech friendly to
take an expansive view of copyright in connection with takedown requests that are prompted by threats
of violence.”); Corynne McSherry, Bad Facts, Really Bad Law: Court Orders Google to Censor
Controversial Video Based on Spurious Copyright Claim, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 26, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/bad-facts-really-bad-law-court-orders-google-censorcontroversial-video-based (“We're hard-pressed to think of a better example of copyright maximalism
trumping free speech.”).
144
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647, 647 (9th Cir. 2014).
145
The en banc case was heard by Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Judges Alex Kozinski, M.
Margaret McKeown, Marsha S. Berzon, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton, Consuelo M.
Callahan, N. Randy Smith, Mary H. Murguia, Morgan Christen and Paul J. Watford. As of August 2018,
there were 22 active judges on the Ninth Circuit, one of whom has been appointed by President Trump.
Active Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, U.S. CTS. FOR NINTH CIR.,
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_active_senior_judges.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
Judge Kozinski resigned from the court in late 2017 and by April 2018 Judge Clifton had taken senior
status, so that in late 2014, the court would have had slightly more than the present twenty-two active
judges.
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Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015).
147
Id. at 747.
143

28

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1

own troubling analysis of the “fixation” issue. Judge McKeown reasoned
that Garcia “never fixed her acting performance in a tangible medium of
expression” because “[f]or better or for worse, Youssef and his crew ‘fixed’
Garcia’s performance in the tangible medium, whether in physical film or in
digital form. However one might characterize Garcia’s performance, she
played no role in fixation.”148
This portion of the opinion is worth discussion because it could easily
be misconstrued by district courts and novice practitioners. Film directors
also do not themselves fix their work; neither do the legal persons we call
film studios. Fixation is literally done by camerapersons and
cinematographers. A rapper who freestyles before a videographer he hired
does not fail the fixation requirement because the rapper is busy rapping.
The same holds true for any musician in a recording studio where the sound
engineer behind the glass wall is controlling the recording equipment. Case
law—none of it cited by the Garcia III decision—makes it abundantly clear
that all this is done “by or under the authority of the author” as long as the
person doing the recording is not interfering with the original expression of
the director, performing artist, map designer, or chief programmer.149
Garcia knew her performance was being recorded and intended her
performance to be recorded—which is the same as Diana Krall in a music
studio recording When I Look in Your Eyes or Guillermo del Toro directing
cinematographer Dan Laustsen to capture the shots he wants in The Shape
of Water. We could salvage Judge McKeown’s comments here if we treat
her conclusion as dependent on the fact that Garcia had been defrauded—
Garcia never agreed to the fixation and the fixation could not be “under her
authority.”
Judge McKeown added this point to the analysis,150 but she clearly
seemed to think that Garcia’s failure to meet the fixation requirement did not
148

Id. at 743–44.
Lindsay v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248 (HB), 1999 WL
816163, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (“The fact that Lindsay did not literally perform the filming, i.e.
by diving to the wreck and operating the cameras, will not defeat his claims of having ‘authored’ the
illuminated footage.”); Andrien v. S. Ocean Cty. Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir.
1991); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that authors may be entitled
to copyright protection even if they do not “perform with their own hands the mechanical tasks of putting
the material into the form distributed to the public”). See also Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sol’s,
Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the programmer’s work was insufficiently original for
authorship where he was told “specifically what to do and how to do it”); JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 482 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2007); Kyjen Co. v. VoToys, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1068–69 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that parties that translated sketches
into toys are not co-authors); Hughes, Right of Fixation, supra note 53, at 415 (2015) (stating that the
1976 Act fixation requirement was preceded by a publication requirement in 1909, which definitely
meant publication by third parties).
150
Garcia, 786 F.3d at 744 (“On top of this, Garcia claims that she never agreed to the film’s
ultimate rendition or how she was portrayed in Innocence of Muslims, so she can hardly argue that the
film or her cameo in it was fixed ‘by or under [her] authority.’”).
149
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depend on fraud. Yet in a sensible copyright analysis, absent fraud or a
similar exigent circumstance, when a performer agrees to have her
performance recorded—whether she is a singer, dancer, or actor—we should
consider that the fixation is made under her authority. In short, this part of
the en banc majority opinion helped inspire Judge Watford to note, in
concurrence, that “much of what the majority says about copyright law may
be wrong.”152
The majority was on firmer ground in its discussion of the problematic
determination of what a “work” would be for Garcia to succeed in her claim.
On this question, the Garcia en banc majority opinion relies on a March 6,
2014 letter from the U.S. Copyright Office that “found that Garcia’s
performance was not a copyrightable work.”153 This is a fair characterization
of the letter’s conclusions. Not surprisingly, the Copyright Office had said
that “for copyright registration purposes, a motion picture is a single
integrated work”154 and that, assuming Garcia’s contribution was “limited to
her acting performance,”155 the office could not “register her performance
apart from the motion picture.”156
That letter had also stated that “an actor . . . in a motion picture is either
a joint author in the entire work or, as most often is the case, is not an author
at all by virtue of a work made for hire agreement”; that “an actor’s . . .
performance in the making of a motion picture is an integrated part of the
resulting work, the motion picture as a whole”; and that “[i]f her contribution
151
Id. The clause “[o]n top of this” indicates that the lack of fixation conclusion does not turn on
Garcia “never agree[ing] to the film’s ultimate rendition or how she was portrayed.” Id. The opinion
states elsewhere that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude Garcia impliedly
licensed the use of the fixation (and, so, implicitly that Garcia agreed to the fixation itself). Id. at 743
n.12 (“[T]he district court found that Garcia granted Youssef a non-exclusive implied license to use her
performance in the film. Although Garcia asked Youssef about Desert Warrior’s content, she in no way
conditioned the use of her performance on Youssef’s representations. On this record, we cannot disturb
the district court’s finding as clearly erroneous.”).
152
Id. at 747 (Watford, J., concurring). Not surprisingly, others have discussed the weirdly wrong
discussion of fixation in the Garcia en banc majority opinion. See Randal Picker, Garcia v. Google
(Again):
Fixing
Copyright?,
MEDIA
INST.
(June
5,
2015),
https://www.mediainstitute.org/2015/06/05/garcia-v-google-again-fixing-copyright/ (describing the
Garcia III majority discussion of fixation as a “quagmire” and concluding “Garcia . . . only participated
in the creation of a brief film clip . . . . [T]he work associated with that clip would be fixed under Garcia’s
authority.”); Sarah Howes, Creative Equity: A Practical Approach to the Actor’s Copyright, 42
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 70, 83 (2016) (criticizing the Garcia III interpretation of the “fixation”
requirement).
153
Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 752 (describing the Letter from Robert J. Kasunic, Associate Register of
Copyrights & Dir. of Registration Policy & Practices, U.S. Copyright Office, to M. Cris Armenta,
Counsel to Cindy Garcia (Mar. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Kasunic Letter]).
154
Id. at 741 (quoting the Kasunic Letter). The Kasunic Letter was itself quoting Letter from Laura
Lee Fischer, Chief of the Performing Arts Div. of the Registration Program at the U.S. Copyright Office,
to M. Cris Armenta, Counsel to Cindy Garcia (Dec. 18, 2012).
155
Id.
156
Id.

30

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1

was not as a work made for hire, she may assert a claim in joint authorship
in the motion picture, but not sole authorship of her performance in a portion
of the work.”157 In short, the 2014 Copyright Office letter is consistent with
the Compendium in assuming that an actor’s dramatic performance can be
original expression protectable by copyright once it is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. Indeed, in oral argument, counsel for Google had
agreed to that proposition,158 arguing instead that “[t]here is no precedent,
zero, for the idea that this, a five second performance is itself a separate
copyrightable work.”159 The problem for Garcia was that her original
expression was inextricably intermingled with the expressive work of
others—it never had an independent existence as its own work.
But in the Garcia majority opinion this sensible problem of what
constitutes a “work” often seems mixed with—and overshadowed by—fear
of an unmanageable system of copyright claims: “Garcia’s theory of
copyright law would result in the legal morass we warned against in
Aalmuhammed—splintering a movie into many different ‘works,’ even in
the absence of an independent fixation. Simply put, as Google claimed, it
‘make[s] Swiss cheese of copyrights.’”160 Recounting films with large casts
of extras, the court warned that “[t]reating every acting performance as an
independent work would not only be a logistical and financial nightmare, it
would turn cast of thousands into . . . copyright of thousands.”161 This fear
of “cherry-picking” copyrights was also on display when the court cautioned
that Garcia’s theory “would enable any contributor from a costume designer
down to an extra or best boy to claim copyright in random bits and pieces of
a unitary motion picture without satisfying the requirements of the
Copyright Act.”162 Part IV will further consider this problem.
But on the issue of where and how to draw the line on a “work,” the
Garcia decision does point to something worth exploring. The court’s
driving concern was about “splintering a movie into many different ‘works,’
even in the absence of an independent fixation.”163 It is that last concept—
“independent fixation” that deserves our attention.164 As the court properly
noted, in Effects Associates v. Cohen, the disputed special-effects footage
had been “independently fixed” and no one disputed the plaintiff’s copyright
157

Id. at 752 (quoting the Kasunic Letter).
Oral
argument
at
25:30,
Garcia
III,
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000006884 (“The [AVP] treaty simply
says performances can be copyrightable; we don’t disagree with that . . . .” ); id. at 25:37 (“We agree that
a performer could have a copyrightable interest in a film. It is normally as a joint author.”).
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Id. at 24:55.
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Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 742.
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165

over that footage. The same is true of musical compositions and sound
recordings used in film soundtracks as well as paintings, prints, sculptures,
models, backdrops, and copyrightable costumes that appear on screen. As
for the hairstylists mentioned in Aalmuhammed, hair styles are akin to
tattoos166—they do have an independent existence, and with enough hair
spray, are definitely fixed.167 In short, films are already compendiums of
independently fixed original expression and our intuitions and copyright
metaphysics are comfortable understanding those things as “works.”
Echoing the Copyright Office letter, the Garcia en banc majority correctly
emphasized that “[w]e in no way foreclose copyright protection” for
“standalone works that are separately fixed and incorporated into a film.”168
This raises one more issue in the case: instead of Garcia’s claim being
over her performance, she could have more credibly claimed copyright in
the particular take of her scene that was used in the Innocence of Muslims.
Assuming Youssef did his filming in a fairly normal way, he, Garcia, and
the film crew would have shot Garcia’s scene separately from others. At that
moment, if all other production on Innocence of Muslims had stopped, no
one would question that there was a bona fide copyright in the audiovisual
scenes shot. At that moment, the filmed scene was a “standalone work that
[was] separately fixed” as it awaited being “incorporated into a film . . . .”169
165
See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that enhancement
of a film through special-effects required compensation to Effects Associates, the owner of the
copyright).
166
Warner Brothers quickly settled a lawsuit over its unauthorized reproduction and use in the film
Hangover II of a tattoo by tattoo artist Victor Witmill. Verified Complaint for Injunctive & Other Relief,
Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, 4:11-cv-00752 (D. Mo. April 28, 2011). See also Noam Cohen,
On Tyson’s Face, It’s Art. On Film, a Legal Issue, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/business/media/21tattoo.html; Matthew Belloni, Warner Bros.
Settles ‘Hangover II’ Tattoo Lawsuit, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 20, 2011, 1:39 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii-203377.
167
It would be hard to deny that some hairdos are sculptural works. See, for example, the “Martian
Girl” or “Martian Madame” in MARS ATTACKS! (Warner Bros. 1996). Mars Attacks! - Martian Girl,
YOUTUBE (June 7, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDAaTzccCik.
168
Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 744 n.13 (“The Copyright Office draws a distinction between acting
performances like Garcia’s, which are intended to be an inseparable part of an integrated film, and
standalone works that are separately fixed and incorporated into a film. We in no way foreclose copyright
protection for the latter—any ‘discrete work in itself that is later incorporated into a motion picture,’ as
the Copyright Office put it.”).
169
In fact, this was the conclusion reached by the court regarding “raw footage” in 16 Casa Duse
v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2015). The appellate panel readily (and correctly) acknowledged
that this raw film footage had its own copyright. Id. (citations omitted) (“[T]he film footage is subject to
copyright protection. An original motion picture is surely a ‘work of authorship’ in which copyright
protection ‘subsists’ under the Copyright Act. And ‘where a work is prepared over a period of time, the
portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time.’ The unedited
film footage at issue in this case seems to us to be an early version of the finished product, constituting
the film ‘as of that time.’ Because ‘the Copyright Act [ ] affords protection to each work at the moment
of its creation,’ copyright subsists even in such an unfinished work.”).
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Of course, this would not have helped Garcia because Youssef and
perhaps others would also have a claim of joint authorship to that scene. But
we can imagine recorded dramatic scenes in which the sole original
expression comes from the dramatic performance—in those cases, copyright
in the recorded scene comes very close to being just a fixed performance.
Part III.A will explore this further.
It is worth adding that if you believe that while there might have been a
copyright in Garcia’s scene as a “standalone work[] that [was] separately
fixed,”170 but that copyright disappeared when the scene was integrated into
the film, then by the same reasoning, does the copyright in all the individual
“cells” painted for a classic animation like Fantasia (1940), Spirited Away
(2001), or The Iron Giant (1999) disappear when the cells are integrated into
the final film?
A few years out, the impact of the en banc Garcia decision on the
question of actors-as-authors has been muted. For example, one copyright
newsletter led off its discussion of the case saying “[a]n en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief because Garcia has no
copyright in her acting performance,”171 but then still advised that
“performers may sometimes be joint authors of the entire work.”172 There
have certainly been some arguable decisions bolstered by language from
Garcia, the most dramatic being the Second Circuit’s extraordinary
conclusion in 16 Casa Duse v. Merkin that the principal director of a film
was not an author of that film.173 Otherwise, courts seem to recognize both
the unusual fact pattern of Garcia and the limited precedential value of its
analysis.174 To date, it looks like Judge Watford was correct that on these
questions of copyright law, the court would have been better off “leaving the
task of crafting broad new rules for a case in which it is actually necessary
to do so.”175
But one lesson from the litigation bears repeating. In Garcia v. Google,
one of the arguments that Google initially raised in its defense was that an
actor’s performance could never rise to the level of authorship because the
170

Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 750 (alteration in original).
Copyright Law Journal, Volume XXIX, No. 5 (Neil Boorstyn, ed.) (Sept.–Oct. 2015) at 52.
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Id. at 54.
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16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 264.
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See, e.g., Mallon v. Mitchell, 224 F. Supp. 3d 97, 103 (D. Mass. 2016) (“Dr. Mallon cites [Garcia
III] for its assertion that treating each iteration or edit of a complicated work as a separate copyrightable
work would ‘make Swiss cheese of copyrights.’ This court appreciates the concerns raised in Garcia, but
does not read those concerns to mean that the cheese can never be divided. Here, it is sliced into two
logical portions.”); see also Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co. Ltd., No. 3:15-cv04084-CRB, 2017 WL 2118342, at *10 n.27 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2017) (“Garcia [III] held an actress did
not have a copyright interest in a five-second acting performance that was incorporated into a film . . .
[and that] [a]lthough the case concerned a fleeting acting performance, Garcia [III]’s holding arguably
denies copyright protection to any ‘inseparable contribution[] integrated into a single work.’”).
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Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 748 (Watford J., concurring).
171
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actor works under a film director and “the creator of a work at another’s
direction, without contributing intellectual modification, is not an author.”176
Early on, Google expressly argued that Garcia could not be an author
because she “had no creative control over the script or her performance[,]”177
in short, a theory that dramatic performers are puppets on strings.178
By the end of the litigation, this argument had disappeared: the
Copyright Office letter, Google counsel in oral argument, and the Garcia en
banc opinions (majority and dissent) all agreed that dramatic performances
can be original expression that make actors eligible to be authors of the
works in which those performances are integrated. The few commentators
who have interpreted Garcia III as a complete repudiation of copyright
interests in dramatic performances179 are simply wrong.
D. Views from the Ivory Tower
Demonstrating that the interest of courts does impact the work of
scholars180 there has been relatively little scholarly commentary on the
question of actors as authors. In the Fleet v. CBS litigation, CBS’s appellate
brief claimed that “[a]ll commentators and case authority agree that an
actors’ performance in a film has the requisite degree of artistic creativity to
be a work protected by copyright law.”181 But the supporting footnote to this
claim referred to one passage in McCarthy’s right of publicity treatise and
nothing more.182
The footnote citing McCarthy’s treatise states that “performance[s] from
a script like a performance of a stage play from a script, are works of
authorship under copyright law[,]” contrasting those with uncopyrightable

176

Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC’s Brief in Response to Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc at 29,
Garcia, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302) [hereinafter Brief in Response to Suggestion]
(citation omitted); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2014), dissolved by, 786
F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“Google argues that Garcia didn’t make a protectible contribution to
the film because Youssef wrote the dialogue she spoke, managed all aspects of the production and later
dubbed over a portion of her scene.”).
177
Brief in Response to Suggestion, supra note 176, at 28 (citation omitted).
178
The phrase comes from an amici brief in the case jointly authored by the author. Balganesh et
al. Brief, supra note 65, at 7.
179
See, e.g. Howes, supra note 152, at 76 (“[The] Ninth Circuit en banc panel said actors have no
copyright interest in the films they make.”).
180
The reverse may not be true. Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law
Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.html;
see also Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFF. (Nov./Dec. 2004),
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2004/review_posner_novdec04.msp
(describing law reviews as “a world where inexperienced editors make articles about the wrong topics
worse”).
181
Respondents’ Opening Brief at *13–14, Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 1, 1996).
182
Id. at n.21 (citing J. T. MC CARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY, 11-77 to 11-78 (1995)).
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athletic performances. In his treatise on copyright law, Paul Goldstein
believes “[a]t bottom, the question of copyright in sports events is the
question whether copyright can attach to fixed but unscripted postures and
movements.”184 Formulated that way, Goldstein concludes that “the better
result . . . is to hold that the movements of players on the field, if original,
constitute copyrightable expression.”185 Goldstein is certainly right that we
would consider the unscripted postures and movements of a dancer or a
performance artist to be copyrightable, but there is still disagreement on
whether an athlete who runs to catch a ball lodged deep into right field is
“expressing.”
David Nimmer agrees that “Congress intended to include within the
realm of protectable subject matter innumerable performances of many
sorts,”186 but, in the shadow of the Garcia decision, he also concludes that
“it makes no sense to invoke an additional category of protection, namely
performance.”187 For Nimmer, “performances should not be written out of
the firmament as legitimate components of copyrightable expression,” but
“performances should be recognized as subject to copyright only as part of
a separate categor[y] of protection, such as motion pictures or sound
recordings.”188 Nimmer concludes that the en banc majority in Garcia
correctly “recognized a performance as being an element of works
potentially subject to copyright protection, but not as a stand-alone category
that itself deserves recognition.”189
All in all, there is very little separating these perspectives. If there is a
contrast between Nimmer’s position and that in the Goldstein and McCarthy
treatises, it seems to stem from not imagining the simplest case of all: one
where the only protectable expression in an audiovisual work is the dramatic
performance. Part III.A presents a thought experiment of this sort. In such a
case, copyright protection of the audiovisual work essentially boils down to
copyright protection of the dramatic performance, just as copyright
protection of a sound recording that has not been subject to sound
engineering essentially boils down to copyright protection of the musical
performance.

183

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[B]y comparison, ‘a live prize fight, baseball game,
horse race or Olympic competition’ are unpredictable and not performed from a script, and thus are not
copyrightable; baseball players' performance and performance of a human cannon ball are events that do
not have the requisite degree of creativity to be protected under copyright[.]”).
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PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12.1, at 2:142 (3d ed. 2018).
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NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12(B)(2), at 2-174.1 (2018).
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Id.
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Id. at § 2.12(B)(4), at 2-181.
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Id. at § 2.12(B)(3), at 2-178.
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III. A STRAIGHTFORWARD ORIGINALITY ANALYSIS
In 1998, Judi Dench won the Academy Award for Best Supporting
Actress for her eight-minute performance as Queen Elizabeth I in
Shakespeare in Love.190 Twenty-two years earlier—in 1966—Beatrice
Straight won the Oscar for Best Supporting Actress for an even shorter (sixminute) performance in Network.191 In 2009, Viola Davis was nominated in
the same category for a stunning single scene in the film Doubt.192 By one
of Google’s early theories in the Garcia litigation, these performances
cannot be “original expression” because the actor worked “at another’s
direction, without contributing intellectual modification.”193 This “puppetson-strings” theory of dramatic acting should strike the copyright-conversant
reader as wildly contrary to American copyright law’s fundamental
principles.
Despite the occasional sturm und drang about “Romantic” authorship
from legal scholars, American law has historically been characterized by a
very low originality threshold for copyright protection.194 In 1991, a
unanimous Supreme Court in Feist reminded us that the requisite level of
creativity for original expression is “extremely low; even a slight amount
will suffice.”195 But at the other end of the twentieth century, Justice Holmes
has already given us the formulation that should govern whether dramatic
190
Adam B. Vary, Should Judi Dench Keep Her ‘Shakespeare in Love’ Oscar?, ENT. WKLY. (Dec.
29, 2008 12:00 PM), http://ew.com/article/2008/12/29/recall-98spactr/.
191
Id.
192
Kate
Kellaway,
Mother
Superior,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
3,
2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/jan/04/doubt-viola-davis (“Davis is only on screen for 11
minutes but to watch her is to understand an entire life. It is an [a]bject lesson in what an actor can convey
in a short space of time. She seems to carry her family history in her face: the violence at home and her
unswerving love for her child. And she looks dowdily embattled but unassailable in her shabby fawn
overcoat . . . . It is no surprise that she has already been nominated for a Golden Globe as best supporting
actress and is tipped to win an Oscar.”); Rudie Obias, 12 Actors Who Earned Oscar Nods for Less Than
20 Minutes of Screen Time, MENTAL FLOSS (Jan. 16, 2016), http://mentalfloss.com/article/73865/12actors-who-earned-oscar-nods-less-20-minutes-screen-time (“[E]stimates range from five to eight
minutes, but Davis made the most of every second, decimating the screen as the mother of a young boy
who may or may not have been molested. She managed to hold her own opposite Meryl Streep (who
earned a Best Actress nod for the role) and competed against her Doubt co-star Amy Adams for Best
Supporting Actress in 2009.”).
193
Brief in Response to Suggestion, supra note 176, at 29 (citation omitted).
194
See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 41
DUKE L.J. 455 (1991); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail
and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1527 (1992) (“The values of romantic authorship seem to
seep—consciously or unconsciously—into economic analysis. And because in most conflicts the
paradigm of authorship tends to fit one side better than the other, this romantic grounding provides
economic analysis with at least the illusion of certainty. Authors tend to win.”). For an analysis and
response to some of the claims made about the pervasiveness of the “Romantic author” idea, see generally
Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998).
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Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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performances can be copyrightable original expression: “Personality always
contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting,
and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction
in the words of the act.”196
When Holmes wrote these words, we were just crossing the
technological frontier into a world in which dramatic performances could be
fixed in a tangible medium of expression—the Lumiere Brothers and
Thomas Edison had debuted their respective “moving pictures” technologies
only a few years before. Now that the fixation of dramatic performances is
a familiar element of life, any “puppet-on-strings” view of acting necessarily
says that while Holmes may have thought handwriting was an act of
individual expression that could attract copyright protection (and we have
no case law disagreeing), dramatic acting is not.
This is not to deny that some dramatic performances may be so de
minimis that they do not cross a minimal threshold for the amount of original
expression.197 Nor is this to deny that some “acting” may be so mechanical
or robotic as to lack original expression. But our general presumption should
be that a dramatic performance is the personal, original expression of the
actor, so when the performance is fixed in a tangible medium it is a proper
subject of copyright protection.
Does this simple formulation get us into the problem that seemed to vex
so many in Garcia v. Google? Does it make a “performance” into a “work”?
No—or, not necessarily. And when it does, that should not be troubling. The
problem is best explored with thought experiments that will hopefully
increase our confidence about dramatic performances as copyrightable
original expression.
A. Some Thought Experiments
As inspiring as the “The Star-Spangled Banner” is, when it comes to
odes to a nation and all it might represent, “America the Beautiful” is a nearperfect song. As a musical composition, “America the Beautiful” has an
unusual history. The melody was composed by Samuel A. Ward as a hymn
196

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
As Benjamin Kaplan wrote in his classic exposition on copyright: “[T]o make the copyright
turnstile revolve, the author should have to deposit more than a penny in the box.” BENJAMIN KAPLAN,
AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 46 (1967); see also COMPENDIUM, supra note 60, at § 313.4(C)
(noting single words and short textual phrases are not copyrightable), § 802.5(B) (“[S]hort musical
phrases are not copyrightable because they lack a sufficient amount of authorship.”), and § 803.5(B)
(“Short sound recordings may lack a sufficient amount of authorship to be copyrightable.”); Justin
Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 577 (2005) (explaining
that generally “American courts have denied blatant claims that very small pieces of copyrightable
material merit independent protection.”)
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in 1882; that hymn was not published until a decade later in 1892. The
lyrics were composed by Katherine Lee Bates as a poem entitled “Pike’s
Peak” and first published in 1895.199 The two were first combined and
published as “America the Beautiful” in 1910, seven years after Ward’s
death.200 From all these dates, the musical composition is obviously in the
public domain.
Among the hundreds of millions of people who have sung “America the
Beautiful” at one time or another, some have authorized that their
performances be fixed in tangible mediums of expression. These sound
recordings of “America the Beautiful” include renditions by Jim Brickman,
Mariah Carey, Aretha Franklin, Whitney Houston, Royce Montgomery,
Mickey Newbury, Elvis Presley, Charlie Rich, and the Mormon Tabernacle
Choir.201 My personal favorites are Ray Charles’ many gorgeous recordings
of the song. These sound recordings are all the more stunning because the
visual tableau of Bates’ lyrics is brought to life by an artist who had been
blind since the age of seven.
Among the different occasions when Charles performed “America the
Beautiful” (and it was recorded with his authorization) Charles had different
accompaniments, ranging from a handful of gospel singers to a full orchestra
with French horns and violins. But let’s consider a sound recording in which
he sings solo, plays the piano, and is accompanied only by a snare drum
keeping time. Let’s also stipulate that the recording is done with minimal
sound engineering.
Does Ray Charles’ performance on that sound recording—fixed with his
authorization in a tangible medium of expression—embody sufficient
originality to be protected by copyright? Is it “original expression” that
crosses the “modicum of creativity” frontier? These are intended as
rhetorical questions: a reader who thinks the answer is “no” will not be
interested in the rest of this article.
By eliminating all accompaniment but the snare drum and minimizing
sound engineering, almost any originality or creativity we believe is in this
sound recording is from Ray Charles. In these circumstances, there is no
question that Congress intended that the performing artist could obtain a
copyright in the sound recording and such copyright would, in effect, be a
copyright in the performance. The House Report accompanying the 1976
Act recognizes that there will be cases where the record producer’s
contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable
198
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element in the work, and there may be cases—for example, recordings of
birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, etc.—where only the record producer’s
contribution is copyrightable.202
It would be hard to have clearer legislative history than this: the House
Report says that protectable elements of a sound recording include the
contribution “of the performers whose performance is captured”203 and that
there will be “cases where . . . the performance is the only copyrightable
element in the work.” 204 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in these
situations, Congress recognized that de facto the recorded performance
would be the protected work. And we should keep in mind that according to
the legislative history, “sound recordings” include non-musical
performances like “[a]n actor’s recorded recitation of a poem” 205 or “a
theatrical company’s recorded performance of a comedy.”206
Now we move from the audio recording of an actor’s recitation of a
poem to the realm of audiovisual works. Imagine that an admired actor—
Morgan Freeman, Ian McKellen, or J.K. Simmons207—does a
Shakespearean soliloquy, i.e. a public domain work that is central to the
Anglo-American repertoire in the same way that “America the Beautiful” is
central to the American songbook. Let’s stipulate that the actor performs the
soliloquy on an absolutely plain set—or in front of a “green screen”208 which
the actor himself set up—with simple lighting and in front of a camera209 on
a tripod. Let’s further stipulate that the actor himself activates the video
camera on the tripod. In other words, we are minimizing any other creative
inputs the same as we did with Ray Charles’ solo rendition of “America the
Beautiful.”

202

Copyright Act of 1976, H.R. 94-1476, 94th Cong. at 56 (1976), available at
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It is not hard to imagine that a recorded performance of a soliloquy from
Hamlet or Macbeth would be dramatic and impressive if done this way by
an accomplished actor. And it is not hard to imagine that each actor would
perform it in a substantially different way: indeed, that is the
originality/creativity we would experience in their respective performances.
If Justice Holmes was correct that “[p]ersonality always contains something
unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone,”210
then it is very hard to see how dramatic performances would not be a
legitimate basis for copyright protection: the personal expression of a
dramatic performance is “something [a person] may copyright unless there
is a restriction in the words of the act.”211 And there are no such restrictions
in the Copyright Act.
As Jane Ginsburg has noted, “[i]f the performer of sounds produces the
‘copyrightable elements’ comprised within a sound recording, it is hard to
see why the performer of both sounds and physical gestures does not supply
‘copyrightable elements’ in an audiovisual work.”212 But the reason for
working through the subject this way is that normally, as Ginsburg observes,
“separating an actor’s performance from the rest of the film seems an
artificial exercise.”213 Imagining an actor’s performance as separate from an
audiovisual work seems quite artificial compared to hearing an Aretha
Franklin or David Bowie sound recording as Aretha Franklin or David
Bowie, even though we know that those sound recordings typically involved
other musicians, backup singers, sound engineers, technicians and
producers. We can feel that we are hearing a single musician even when we
know that, as Robert Brauneis says, our sound recordings are not
“transparent recordings of real-time performances,”214 but “carefully
constructed fictional audio experiences.”215 The same does not hold for our
audiovisual experiences—hence the need for a reductionist thought
experiment that eliminates the other potential sources of original expression.
Staying with that thought experiment, would anyone say that the § 102
“audiovisual work” that is a recording of the actor’s performance does not
have a copyright because it didn’t have a traditional director,
cinematographer, or set designer? Would we say that this audiovisual work
does not have a copyright because the “script” was in the public domain?
Clearly not: this minimalist audiovisual work of an actor performing a public
210
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domain work is capable of having copyright protection solely on the basis
that the actor’s performance has that magical, but egalitarian “modicum of
creativity.”
At this juncture, we should change the public domain script into an
original, copyrighted script. Does the new presence of the screenwriter’s
original expression eliminate any original expression from the dramatic
performer? It is hard to imagine the theory on which this happens. In fact,
that is the nature of copyright in “cover” sound recordings when a musician
performs a musical composition composed by someone else. Meshell
Ndegeocello’s copyright in her 2018 sound recording of “Sometimes It
Snows in April”216 is as secure as her copyright in her 1993 sound recording
of “If That’s Your Boyfriend (He Wasn’t Last Night),”217 although Prince
composed the former while Ndegeocello composed the latter.
If we add a cinematographer and a lighting director to our minimalist
audiovisual work, the right questions are if and how are these roles different
in terms of original expressive contribution from what a sound engineer or
a “mixer” add to a sound recording? We do not think that because Elvis
Presley had the legendary sound engineer Bill Porter work on the sound
recording of “Return to Sender” that Presley’s original expression in the
sound recording is compromised.218
One role we have not yet added is the “director”—and one could argue
whether or not music “producers” are a standard counterpart in the world of
sound recordings. A film or television director “is the person primarily
responsible for supervising the creation of a film or television program”219
and “the chief on-set decision maker”220 whose “function is to contribute to
all of the creative elements of a film and to participate in molding and
integrating them into one cohesive dramatic and aesthetic whole.”221 Now
the question we asked before might have some traction: does the presence
of a director for the audiovisual work eliminate any original expression from
the actor? Google’s puppets-on-strings view of dramatic performances early
in the Garcia litigation said “yes.”
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Of course, there are audiovisual works in which the dramatic
performances are puppets on strings—the marionettes in Team America:
World Police (2004),222 directed by Trey Parker, and the 1960s
Thunderbirds television series that directly inspired it.223 We can imagine a
not too distant future in which the marionettes are replaced by programmable
androids: when the director doesn’t get exactly the effect she wants, she can
have the androids reprogrammed to deliver just the right wink of an eye, just
the right curl to a smile, just the right stride across the room. More likely—
and we are partially there now224—the director can employ digital avatars,
i.e. CGI “actors.” In all these examples, the director might have substantially
more control over the final outcomes, the final original expression as a
whole.
But no director has complete control over human actors, whether they
are acting in front of the camera, only lending their voices to CGI-created
cartoon characters, or merely operating marionettes. And as we will see,
within the realm of what a director can theoretically control, many directors
cede substantial leeway to actors.
B. Views Within the Acting Community
Certainly, the acting community seems to believe that actors engage in
a creative process, using the same terminology to describe what they do as
writers and painters use to describe what they do. A classic text on acting,
Uta Hagen’s A Challenge for the Actor, speaks of an actor as someone with
a “need to express”225 and “a passion for self-expression,”226 someone who
is intent “to produce a work of art”227 and does so in a “creative process”228
by “revealing the myriad facets that spring from [her] own soul and
imagination.”229 Hagen calls her own method-based approach to acting
“realism” and describes it as executing a series of actions that “involve a
222
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moment-to-moment subjective experience,”
“weav[ing]” personal
realities “imaginatively into the circumstances of the character’s past
life.”231
Laurette Taylor, a silent film star, described acting as “the physical
representation of a mental picture and the projection of an emotional
concept”232 and twenty-first century actor Tom Hiddleston offers that
“[a]ctors in any capacity, artists of any stripe, are inspired by their curiosity,
by their desire to explore all quarters of life.”233 Dana Ivey describes her
acting process in words that could be used by a novelist or playwright:
All creative people use whatever is going on in their lives in
what they are creating at that moment whether they are aware
of it or not. I’m not proud I use any resource that comes along.
I’ll copy people. I’ll remember something I had for breakfast
that gives me a thought. You never know when the “Aha!”
experience is going to strike and you’re going to say “Oh, yes!
That’s the way to make that work!”234
After conducting a series of interviews with stage and film actors in the
1990s, Janet Sonenberg concluded that acting “relies in part upon the
creative application of the unconscious mind [and] cannot be fully
explained,”235 that “[a]ll the actors strive to release the daring of their
fundamental creativity,”236 and that her interviewees expressed “similar
ideas” to Albert Rothenberg’s theory of creativity in the 1994 book
Creativity and Madness.237
Of course, there is an alternative vision that sees acting simply as
recitation or “recitation+”: recitation with authenticity, recitation with
sincerity, and other combinations. The director and playwright David Mamet
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seems to be a proponent of this vision of acting, although it is hard to
separate his views on acting from his disdain for acting coaches and acting
schools.239 Actors sometimes make statements in this vein,240 although even
naysayers on actor creativity make statements hinting that copyright’s low
threshold of originality is crossed. For example, Declan Donnellan urges
actors that “[i]n a way, creativity and originality are none of our business,”241
but does so with an almost Holmesian faith in the uniqueness of the
individual actor: “Every actor who plays Juliet will see through a different
pair of eyes, because each actor is a different and unique human being . . . .
Whenever we try to be original, it is evidence that we have lost confidence
in our uniqueness.”242 Even actors who intensely research their roles for
verisimilitude243 do not seem to be doing anything different in terms of
inputs to the creative process than the research of historical novelists or
Disney Imagineers.
Recall Google’s early argument in the Garcia litigation that an actor is
a “creator of a work at another’s direction, without contributing intellectual
modification, [and, therefore,] is not an author.”244 Reasonably understood,
this presents a zero-sum game of artistic contribution in which the film
director has all and the actor has zero. While not a zero-sum game, there is
unquestionably a trade-off between the director’s artistic control and
238
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expression and the creative expression of the actor. And the relationship is
complex. Addressing the director, Hagen writes “[i]f you believe your own
[interpretation of a role] is definitive or the only one, you are not only wrong,
but you will stultify the actor’s imagination and rob him of creative
freedom.”245 For actor and director Andy Serkis, it is the director’s
“prerogative to shift the performance to shape the narrative and tone, but the
skill is to do that without in any way fettering what actors want to do.”246
Indeed, the balance between the director and the actor is itself
downstream from the trade-off between the scriptwriter and the director. In
a scripted motion picture, the script constrains the director and both script
and direction—that is, the director—constrain the actors. So if we believe
that the director can bring “authorial” originality to the final recorded
performance despite the script, it is not clear how we could say the actor
cannot also bring “authorial” originality to the final recorded performance
despite the script and the direction. As Richard Arnold puts it, “[t]he wider
the margin of appreciation left by the text, the more likely it is that the
director will qualify as an author. The more dictatorial the director, the less
likely it is that the actors will qualify as authors.”247 In short, as long as an
actor is not a mechanical or digital amanuensis for the director, there is space
for the original expression that American copyright law protects.
So what can we say on the bedrock question of whether the actor is
merely an amanuensis for the director and the screenwriter? Is the actor just
“the creator of a work at another’s direction,” or someone who contributes
intellectual, emotional, or expressive “modification”?248 Initially, we should
put to one side a couple of distinct fact patterns.
First, there are many situations in which it is inaccurate to say that the
actor “had no creative control over the script.”249 After they are cast, actors
can have considerable impact on a script, whether it is Lily Tomlin in 9 to 5
(1980),250 John Turturro in Barton Fink251 and Jungle Fever252 (both 1991),
or Daniel-Day Lewis in Phantom Thread (2017).253
245
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Second, even after the script is “complete,” there may be scenes in which
the actors are invited to, expected to, or simply take it upon themselves to
ad-lib—and that original expression is kept in the final film. Actor adlibbing includes: Bogart’s “Here’s looking at you, kid” in Casablanca
(1942);254 Orson Welles’ take on European history in The Third Man
(1949);255 Robert de Niro’s entire “Are you talkin’ to me?” scene in Taxi
Driver (1976);256 John Belushi’s cafeteria scene in Animal House (1978);257
eighteen minutes of Marlon Brando’s dialogue as Colonel Kurtz in
Apocalypse Now (1979);258 the “What do you mean funny?” restaurant scene
in Goodfellas (1990);259 and much of the dialogue in The Little Hours
(2017).260 We can add to this list some of Bill Murray’s lines in Ghostbusters
(1984);261 Whoopi Goldberg’s lines in Ghost (1990);262 Denzel
Washington’s lines in Malcolm X (1992);263 and Jack Nicholson’s lines in A
Few Good Men (1992).264 The director of Thor: Ragnarok (2017) claims the
entire film was “80% improvised.”265
In situations in which actors ad-lib or largely ad-lib their performance,
the initial fixation of the dialogue constitutes the initial fixation of what we
think of as the “script” in the same way that an authorized recording of a
thread-paul-thomas-anderson-20171221-story.html (describing Daniel-Day Lewis’ extensive influence
in the development of the script for Phantom Thread).
254
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jazz jam session can be the first fixation of both a new musical composition
and a new sound recording.266 But no matter how extensive or brilliant the
ad-libbing, Hollywood practice and collective bargaining agreements make
it improbable that an actor would ever be given writing credit for a script.267
But let us eliminate both situations in which the actor has significant
input on the script prior to shooting and situations in which actors “write”
meaningful portions of the script through permitted ad-libbing. Let us focus
on what happens once the script is stabilized and filming has started. The
Google argument was that actors are not authors because they only “create”
the work at the film director’s direction and “the creator of a work at
another’s direction, without contributing intellectual modification, is not an
author.”268
The creative process of shooting a film is often more collaborative with
significant modifications contributed by the actor. Actor John Turturro
describes one experience of working with the Coen Brothers this way:
Because I played so many scenes by myself in Barton Fink, I
absolutely needed Joel and Ethan to bounce off of. We would
try everything one way, and then we’d experiment, trying it
another way. They were excited because I was coming up with
stuff that they hadn’t imagined. Because they worked very
hard, I figured it was my job to truly understand what they
wanted and to give them choices within their structure that
they never even thought of.269
While Turturro’s Barton Fink experience may be extreme, it is not
unusual for actors to add expression to their characters that the director
neither sought nor seeks to suppress (once the actor demonstrates the
expression).270 Whether stage or film, one can think of the interpretation
266
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865 F. Supp. 1416, 1424–25 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that there is “no distinction between the
performance and the recording of the performance” for purposes of establishing federal copyright
protection where the performance at issue was a live radio program featuring call-in guests and banter
between co-hosts). Robert Brauneis has deftly explored how the Copyright Office’s acceptance of sound
recordings as fixations of musical compositions may have altered our concept of those compositions.
Brauneis, supra note 214, at 2–7.
267
See Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property Rights in Markets for Labor and
Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild of America, 1938-2000, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 215,
251–55 (2011) (describing the various types of credit given and who may receive it); id. at 252–53
(explaining that one reason for the Writers Guild’s tight control of writing credit is “[t]he view . . . that
writers will enjoy the status akin to directors as the author of a film only if and when one or two writers
control, and are perceived as controlling, the content of the script and the construction of the story”).
268
Brief in Response to Suggestion, supra note 176, at 29.
269
Interview with John Turturro, in SONENBERG, supra note 234, at 39.
270
For example, the actor Betty Gabriel Georgina, who played a young black woman whose body
has been possessed by an older white woman in the 2017 film Get Out, added “tiny physical glitches”
inspired by old horror films and the idea that “not all the wires were connected quite right.” Lisa Rosen,

2019]

ACTORS AS AUTHORS IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW

47

developed by the director and actors as a “text” layered on top of the text of
the script.271 Matthew Sussman’s description of the experience of a theatrical
understudy can also apply to film:
[C]ertain vocal properties and physical gestures have become
part of the text. For the understudy, two texts exist: the written
word and the performance text the actors are doing each night.
That performance text is like a transparency laid over the
written text. There are comic or dramatic beats that have
developed through the idiosyncrasies of the actor and his
approach to the character, in collaboration with the other
actors and the director. For instance, in the bar scene [in Angels
in America], Roy talks about being family, ‘la familia,’ and
then, just at the top of what looks like a hearty embrace, Ron
mimed shooting Joe in the head with his finger like a Mafia
execution. That’s a big laugh in the show. It’s not in Tony
Kushner’s text, but the gesture, the laugh—the whole beat—
has become part of the scene. 272
While Sussman was describing theater performance, the same happens
when the actor uses an ad-lib line, adds a dramatic pause, or gives his
character some physical tic that gets into the final cut of the film: the
sequence of those dramatic performances is like a transparency laid over the
film script.273
Here it may be worthwhile to consider the different relationship between
actors and directors in film and in theater. In the case of film, the director
has significant control over the actor’s performance in post-production—a
kind of control that does not exist in theater.274 The director can decide which
among various takes to use, often using a performance that the actor might
not consider her best.275 The director or the producer can cut the scene,
slightly slow or speed up the performance, even running some frames
backwards.276 This is a kind of control unimaginable to a theater director.277
Making Each Moment Count, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2017, at S26. Christopher Plummer described his
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On the other hand, while theater directors have weeks of rehearsal with
actors to produce the overall performance the director envisions, consistent
anecdotal evidence from the film industry is that film directors rely more on
actors to develop an interpretation of their character, sometimes with limited
input from the director.278 For the film Fedora, actor Frances Sternhagen
asked director Billy Wilder for time to discuss her character.279 Sternhagen
reports, “[a]nd he just said, ‘You do what you were doing in Equus. You will
be marvelous.’ He wasn’t going to tell me anything and so I just made my
own preparations.”280 Kathleen Turner reports the same of director John
Huston: “[o]n Prizzi’s Honor, John Huston used to say to Jack [Nicholson]
and me, ‘Just call me when you’ve got it. We’ll come in and shoot.’”281 To
echo Richard Arnold, the less the director is dictatorial and the more the
director is collaborative,282 the more space there is for original expression
from the actors.
Nonetheless, one could still conclude that while “genuine human
creativity” goes “into acting a script,” nonetheless “this creativity is different
in kind and in degree from the creativity that goes into creating fixed, authordriven works like literature and visual art.”283 This is the foundation for the
belief—prevalent in civil law jurisdictions—that granting performers
“related rights” or “neighboring rights” is a better approach than extending
copyright to performers’ creative expression.284 It is worth reflecting on how
“performance” originality might be viewed—or might have come to be
viewed—as different from “authorial” originality.285
In one sense, the creativity in a performance—musical or dramatic—is
parasitic, or dependent on the creativity in the pre-existing musical or
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director Steven Soderbergh and actor Sharon Stone).
283
Victor, supra note 67, at 86 (“[G]enuine human creativity goes into acting a script or performing
a music composition, but . . . this creativity is different in kind and in degree from the creativity that goes
into creating the fixed, author-driven works, like literature and visual art.”).
284
In the traditional European view, “[p]erformance and interpretation are regarded as something
quite different from authorship, and so performers are held not to have any role in the creation of dramatic
and musical works.” ARNOLD, supra note 247, § 10.03 at 279.
285
Id.
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literary work. But that itself would not be enough to cordon off creative
expression in performance from copyright. For example, editorial work is
also dependent or parasitic. If that were the difference between types of
creativity, why should selection and arrangement of Walt Whitman’s poems
give a copyright to the anthology editor, but a recorded reading of Walt
Whitman’s poems would not give a copyright to the performer? Why should
a sufficiently original recorded performance of a public domain dramatic
work not receive a copyright when a sufficiently original condensed version
of the same public domain dramatic work would garner a copyright?
Alternatively, the sense that there is a difference here may be rooted in
a perceived difference between composition and performance. Discussing
musical compositions and sound recordings, Robert Brauneis proposes that
composition has been seen as a “deliberative activity that allow[s] rethinking
and editing” while performance has been seen as an “unrepeatable,
evanescent, . . . real-time, low-deliberation, no-editing activity.”287
But such a distinction breaks down quickly. Brauneis has skillfully
explored how sound recordings themselves became musical compositions—
with more specificity and detail than can be captured by standard musical
notation.288 This is not too distant from Sussman’s idea that a successful
theatre production has a “performance text” that is “laid over” the written
script.289 And the distinction between a single work that is repeatedly edited
versus repetition of action may better describe most literary works than some
artistic works.290 A visual artist may do many sketches which are preliminary
to a final drawing or painting, just as a performer may do many takes before
settling on a final, satisfactory performance. Both the visual artist and the
performer (musical or dramatic) may learn what works in those preliminary
efforts. On the other side of the ledger, an artistic work does not lose that
status if there was neither editing nor iterative expression. Drawings and
even some paintings might be done in a matter of minutes; an essay or
musical jingle might “pour” forth from a writer or composer in a short, single
session.

286

Id.
Robert Brauneis, supra note 214, at 2, 8 (footnotes omitted) (“Composition—a deliberative
activity that allowed rethinking and editing—produced a score, a stable, visually perceptible . . . set of
prescriptions for musicians to follow . . . . Performance contrasts with composition in many respects.
While a score is stable and visually perceptible, performance is unrepeatable, evanescent, and aural.
While composition is a deliberative process that allows for trial-and-error editing, performance is a realtime, low-deliberation, no-editing activity.”).
288
See id. at 2–3 (describing the special nature of composition).
289
Interview with Matthew Sussman, in SONENBERG, supra note 234, at 153.
290
See id. (noting that an actor’s idiosyncrasies may become an important part of the performance).
287
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IV. THE NON-PROBLEMS OF JOINT AUTHORSHIP AND ‘CAST OF
THOUSANDS’
If we start with the premise that an actor may contribute protectable
expression to an audiovisual work, does that lead inextricably to the Ninth
Circuit’s “proverbial ‘cast of thousands’”291 problem? And keep in mind that
that problem could take the form of either thousands of distinct copyright
claims or thousands of claims to joint authorship.292 Some of the darker
language in Judge McKeown’s en banc opinion suggests that fear of this
problem could justify completely denying the possibility of protectable
expression in actors’ performances.293
Yet even after Garcia, worrying about “copyright of thousands”294 in
audiovisual works is like worrying about snow in South Florida—perhaps
we should have contingencies in place, but the arrangement of the world is
such that the problem will rarely occur. To use the words of the Supreme
Court in Qualitex, denying authorship to actors because of the “cast of
thousands” problem would “rel[y] on an occasional problem to justify a
blanket prohibition.”295 First, let us sketch out the existing filters—law and
customary practices built on law—that almost always prevent the Garcia
problem.
After reviewing this familiar turf—and how those filters are likely to
remain robust in the future—we will turn to how the “copyright of
thousands” problem may have contributed to a troubled jurisprudence of
joint authorship. While this is not the place for a full-blown exploration of
what has gone wrong in the case law on joint authorship, it is important to
understand why joint authorship in audiovisual works is not the scary
outcome that it may have appeared to be to Judge McKeown.
To the degree that courts have struggled to avoid judgments of joint
authorship, they may have done so in the mistaken belief that a finding of
joint authorship would require equal shares among the joint authors. But in
situations in which the work-for-hire and implied licensing doctrines fail, a
291

Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 742.
See id. (foreseeing the problems of “[u]ntangling . . . tens, hundreds, or even thousands of
standalone copyrights”).
293
Id. at 743 (citations omitted) (“The reality is that contracts and the work-made-for-hire doctrine
govern much of the big-budget Hollywood performance and production world. Absent these formalities,
courts have looked to implied licenses. Indeed, the district court found that Garcia granted Youssef just
such an implied license to incorporate her performance into the film. But these legal niceties do not
necessarily dictate whether something is protected by copyright, and licensing has its limitations. As
filmmakers warn, low-budget films rarely use licenses. Even if filmmakers diligently obtain licenses for
everyone on set, the contracts are not a panacea. Third-party content distributors, like YouTube and
Netflix, won’t have easy access to the licenses; litigants may dispute their terms and scope; and actors
and other content contributors can terminate licenses after thirty[-]five years. Untangling the complex,
difficult-to-access, and often phantom chain of title to tens, hundreds, or even thousands of standalone
copyrights is a task that could tie the distribution chain in knots.”).
294
Id.
295
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168 (1995).
292
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greater willingness to find joint authorship with a quick determination of
unequal shares might be a better solution. In contrast, if the case law makes
the contribution
of creative professionals—actors,
directors,
cinematographers—seem to “disappear” when there are no contractual
arrangements, the jurisprudence will give unscrupulous producers a reason
not to get rights and not to enter into contracts.
A. The Filters that Prevent Both Copyright of Thousands and Thousands
of Joint Authors
Everyone agrees that there is a robust set of filters that, in almost any
fact pattern, keep an actor from being deemed an author in an audiovisual
work in which the actor’s performance is fixed. As Jay Dougherty noted in
2016, actors being authors:
[Is] not really a problem in almost every case because
generally in films everyone works for hire. Maybe rarely it’s a
joint work, but even if it isn’t, there is a possibility of
assignment, and even if there is no assignment then there is an
implied license in almost every case.296
In other words, audiovisual performances are almost always governed
by an express contract that links to statutory provisions ensuring any
copyright interests belong to the film’s producers, and where the copyright
interests fail to consolidate completely under the film producer’s control, the
producer will almost certainly have some ownership interest or an implied
license. But even this account starts mid-way in the various filters against
the “copyright of thousands.”297
1. More Than de Minimis Original Expression
In both Garcia and Aalmuhammed, the Ninth Circuit was motivated by
an overblown fear of “splinter[ed]” copyright interests. In Garcia, the court
cautioned against views that “would enable any contributor from a costume
designer down to an extra or best boy to claim copyright in random bits and
pieces of a unitary motion picture without satisfying the requirements of the
Copyright Act.”298 This is directly linked to a line of thinking in
296
Jay Dougherty, The Misapplication of “Mastermind”: A Mutant Species of Work for Hire and
the Mystery of Disappearing Copyrights, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463, 466 (2016) (citation omitted); see
also Diana C. Obradovich, Garcia v. Google: Authorship in Copyright, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785,
792 (2016) (noting that the question of authorship or co-ownership rarely arises with motion pictures
because of the work-for-hire doctrine, and because motion pictures are normally joint, not collective,
works).
297
See Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 743 (identifying the problems resulting from “[t]reating every acting
performance as an independent work”).
298
Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 737.
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Aalmuhammed where, in its concern about who counts as an “author” of a
motion picture, the court had observed that “[e]veryone from the producer
and director to casting director, costumer, hairstylist, and ‘best boy’ get
listed in the movie credits because all of their creative contributions really
do matter.”299
Of course, the costume designer already can have separate, protectable
copyright interests; if the costume she designed is copyrightable,300 its
appearance in a film is no different than a painting, poster, or quilt on a
wall.301 As discussed above, the same might be true of hairstylists or other
types of artists.302 But recognition in movie credits is simply not the same
thing as recognition of a creative contribution to a film. Drivers, caterers,
personal assistants to featured performers, best boys, casting directors, and
lawyers for the production may be listed in closing “credit crawls” without
anyone thinking they contributed original expression seen or heard on the
screen.303
Copyright’s bedrock requirement of original expression prevents most
of these people from being in the universe of potential copyright claimants.
In normal circumstances, the best boy—an assistant to an electrician on a
film crew304—would not contribute any original expression to the film. It is
the same with an extra in a crowded marketplace or battle scene: they
probably contribute no original expression and, if they do, unauthorized
reproduction would likely be de minimis.305 While a claimant might argue

299

Id. at 742 (quoting Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Many costumes will be analyzed under the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Star
Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017) (holding that a feature on
cheerleading uniforms “is eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a twoor three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work”).
301
See Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 126 F.3d 70, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the
use of a poster of a quilt as decoration on a television set could be non-de minimis copying when the
poster appears sufficiently in the television program).
302
See supra Section II.C (discussing circumstances in which various types of professionals may
produce copyrightable work).
303
Conversely, the names of dancers and members of orchestras playing on the soundtrack—people
who might make a creative contribution—are typically omitted, appearing neither in opening nor closing
credits.
304
Best Boy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/best%20boy (last
visited Sept. 23, 2018) (defining “best boy” as “the chief assistant to the gaffer in motion-picture or
television
production”);
Gaffer,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/gaffer (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (defining “gaffer” as “a lighting electrician on
a motion-picture or television set”).
305
De minimis is principally used as a filter establishing a quantum for actionable infringement.
See, e.g., Neal Publ’ns v. F & W Publ’ns, 307 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931–32 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that
copying a few words and phrases from a human resources guide was de minimis); Werlin v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 463–64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (determining that duplication of two sentences
from article was de minimis copying).
300
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that what was taken was a substantial part of their original expression,
with audiovisual works, the de minimis doctrine has special application. As
formulated by the Second Circuit in the 1997 Ringgold v. Black
Entertainment Television decision: “In cases involving visual works . . . the
quantitative component of substantial similarity also concerns the
observability of the copied work—the length of time the copied work is
observable in the allegedly infringing work and such factors as focus,
lighting, camera angles, and prominence.”307 This variation on the de
minimis doctrine has been used to turn back several claims of infringement
in audiovisual works.308
In short, the requirements that a plaintiff contribute original expression
and that the appearance of that original expression cross a de minimis
threshold knock out much of the parade of horribles envisioned in Garcia
and Aalmuhammed.
2. Work-for-Hire Doctrine
It is not an overstatement to say that the work made for hire (or workfor-hire) doctrine is “an essential building block for the movie industry,”309
a building block consisting of both customary business relationships and
statutory law that reflects those relationships. Codified in American
copyright law in 1909 and re-codified in 1976, the doctrine provides that
when the “work made for hire” conditions are met, the “employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author” for
purposes of copyright law.310
As Catherine Fisk observes, in the United States “[f]ilm and television
production is a densely unionized industry”311 in which the unions
representing actors, writers, directors, musicians, make-up artists, set
designers, sound engineers, and more all engage in collective bargaining
with television and film producers. It is fair to say the economic position of
all these creative professionals was established early on more through their
306

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, § 13.03(A)(2)(a) (“The question in each case is whether
the similarity relates to matter that constitutes a substantial portion of plaintiffs work—not whether such
material constitutes a substantial portion of defendant's work.”).
307
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997).
308
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that photos’
appearance in the background of the film Seven was de minimis); Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d
922, 924–25 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the appearance of a dental illustration in an infomercial was
fleeting, unfocused, and de minimis).
309
Randal C. Picker, Garcia v. Google: Stanislavski and Meisner Pay a Visit to Copyright, MEDIA
INST. (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.mediainstitute.org/2014/03/11/garcia-v-google-stanislavski-andmeisner-pay-a-visit-to-copyright (“The work made for hire doctrine is an essential building block for the
movie industry.”).
310
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
311
Fisk, supra note 267, at 221.
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collective action than through the clarity of their intellectual property
rights.312 This collective bargaining system produces a robust baseline
contractual structure for the vast majority of creative professionals in the
audiovisual industry—a baseline contractual structure that relies on statutory
work-for-hire provisions to consolidate economic rights with producers.
Standard form contracting for actors in the audiovisual industry typically
provides that:
[A]ll results and proceeds of Performer’s services, including,
without limitation, all literary and musical material, designs
and inventions of Performer shall be deemed to be a work
made for hire for Producer within the meaning of the copyright
laws of the United States or any similar or analogous law or
statute of any other jurisdiction and accordingly, Producer
shall be the sole and exclusive owner for all purposes . . . . 313
Similar provisions abound in the world of audiovisual contracts.314 This
is not only how the statutory work-for-hire provisions are used in the
audiovisual industry; this is also how Congress intended the provisions to be
used. The definition of a “work made for hire” in the 1976 Copyright Act
was expanded to include “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use

312
For a discussion of the labor struggle of screenwriters, see CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR
HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE 137–38 (2016) (outlining elements of writers’
efforts with the Writers Guild); CYNTHIA LITTLETON, TV ON STRIKE: WHY HOLLYWOOD WENT TO WAR
OVER THE INTERNET 259 (2013) (recounting labor struggles of screenwriters in light of the emergence of
streaming sources for television content). Much the same thing happened with live theater in the United
States when playwrights organized and collectively demanded a more equitable economic relationship
with play producers. See Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1381, 1418–20 (2010) (discussing unionization of playwrights and ensuing developments with
producers).
313
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, Form 23-40 (providing also for the waiver of moral rights
and their transfer to Producers “to the extent permitted by law”). In another standard form provided in
the Nimmer treatise, the counterpart provision reads:

Player acknowledges and agrees that all of the results and proceeds of Player’s
services pursuant to this Agreement, including all material suggested, composed,
written or performed by Player, shall be considered a “work-made-for-hire” specially
ordered or commissioned by us and that we are and shall be the sole and exclusive
owner . . . .
Id., Form 23-41.
314
For example, two standard contracts contain similar language covering “all results, product and
proceeds of Writer’s services (including all original ideas in connection therewith) [that] are being
specially ordered by Producer for use as part of a Motion Picture.” Writer’s Theatrical Short-Form
GUILD
OF
AMERICA
WEST,
¶
24,
available
at
Contract,
WRITERS
https://www.wga.org/contracts/contracts/other-contracts/standard-theatrical (last visited Sept. 24, 2018);
see also Writer’s Theatrical Short-Form Contract–Writers Lending Agreement, WRITERS GUILD OF
AMERICA WEST, ¶ 25, available at https://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/contracts/othercontracts/shortformwriterloanout.docx (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (including near-identical language).
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315

as . . . a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.” The legislative
history of the 1976 Act noted that “a motion picture would normally be a
joint rather than a collective work with respect to those authors who actually
work on the film, although their usual status as employees for hire would
keep the question of co-ownership from coming up.”316 Some commentators
are understandably critical of the work-for-hire provisions in American
copyright law,317 but in the “densely unionized” audiovisual industry, in
exchange for the transfer of ownership galvanized by work-for-hire, the
guilds obtain minimum salaries and wages, “residual” payments, financial
support for health care programs, protection of workplace conditions,
control of credits or attribution rights, and more.318
3. Implied Licensing
When it comes to assignments, federal copyright law’s requirement of a
written, signed transfer preempts any flexibility otherwise provided by state
contract law.319 Perhaps because of this strictness concerning the complete
transfer of rights, courts have been liberal in their interpretation of situations
in which an author or other copyright owner has impliedly granted a nonexclusive license for use of copyrighted material.320 Implied licensing is
often coupled with the work-for-hire doctrine as providing a one-two punch
to ensure that economic rights in audiovisual works may be exploited by the
film producer. 321
315
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for hire”). Although actors’ contracts recite that
their contribution is a “work made for hire,” obviously that takes us back to the problem of whether an
actor’s performance is a “work.”
316
H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
317
See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Authors in Disguise: Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Got
It Wrong, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 741, 749 (2007) (“The work-for-hire doctrine perhaps can be justified
when it operates to divest an author of copyright ownership given the economic quid pro quo she
receives. On the other hand, by allowing an author to relinquish her authorship status and all that such
status entails, the work-for-hire doctrine arguably undermines authorship dignity in a fundamental
way.”); MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM 127 (2009) (asserting that “nothing should or need be” a
work-for-hire). But see Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 513, 567, 569–70 (2017) (discussing the positive economic effect of work-for-hire in
transactions between companies and “creative professionals”).
318
See Fisk, supra note 267, at 218–19 (discussing the functions of a union in the audiovisual
industry).
319
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012) (“A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law,
is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing
and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”).
320
If true, this would not be a unique case of courts creating work-arounds against strict statutory
provisions. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 312, at 1403–10 (suggesting that courts sometimes recognized
common law performance rights in dramatic works as a response to situations in which statutory
copyrights were defective).
321
See Picker, supra note 152 (“As applied to movies, the work-made-for-hire doctrine is designed
to avoid the fragmentation of rights that might otherwise arise regarding a film, where any one person
who did something in the making of the movie that gave rise to a separate work might be able to hold
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The classic case in this area is the Ninth Circuit’s 1990 Effects
Associates, Inc. v. Cohen322 decision. In that case, a special effects company
agreed to create “footage to enhance certain action sequences in the film,”323
and Cohen, the film producer, “agreed to the deal orally, but no one said
anything about who would own the copyright in the footage.”324 Effects
Associates delivered the special effects scenes, but Cohen did not pay the
agreed amount, and Effects Associates sued for copyright infringement.325
Following an earlier Ninth Circuit case, the court concluded that an implied
license had been granted when “Effects created a work at defendant's request
and handed it over, intending that defendant copy and distribute it.”326
Today, there is no question that a non-exclusive license to copyright
rights may “be implied from conduct”327 and Effects Associates is widely
recognized as establishing a tripartite test. An implied nonexclusive license
is created when: “(1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work;
(2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the
licensee who requested it; and (3) the licensor intends that the licenseerequestor copy and distribute his work.”328
With only slight tweaking, these requirements map onto an actor’s
dramatic performance for an audiovisual work: the film producer requests
the performance; the actor gives the performance and delivers it while
authorizing its fixation by the film producer; and the actor intends that the
film producer copy and distribute the performance. So, as Bill Patry notes,
generally speaking, “[t]he correct approach to resolving the situation where
an individual . . . contributes expression to a work but is found not to be a
joint author is to find an implied license.”329 Indeed, the implied licensing of
an actor’s contribution to an audiovisual work—as well as contributions of
set designers, costumers, lighting, and cinematographers—finds strong
support in the Berne Convention itself. Returning to Article 14bis of the
Berne Convention, Article 14bis(2)(b) provides:
out and block the distribution of that movie. And, even if the work-made-for-hire rules haven’t been
implemented perfectly in a particular case, the usually generous rules regarding express or implied
licenses to use copyrighted works will again make possible the distribution of the movie.”).
322
908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
323
Id. at 556.
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
Id. at 558 (citing and discussing Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984)).
327
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, § 10.03(A)(2).
328
I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Effects Assoc., 908 F.2d at 558–
59); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shaver,
74 F.3d at 776); see also Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 500–01 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying Effects
Associates’ three-factor test in dispute over architectural drawings); FenF, LLC v. Healio Health Inc.,
No. 5:08CV404, 2009 WL 10688713, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2009) (applying Effects Associates’
three-factor test in a case where one company used copyrighted images of another on its own website).
329
2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:17 (2018).
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[I]n the countries of the Union which, by legislation, include
among the owners of copyright in a cinematographic work
authors who have brought contributions to the making of the
work, such authors, if they have undertaken to bring such
contributions, may not, in the absence of any contrary or
special stipulation, object to the reproduction, distribution,
public performance, communication to the public by wire,
broadcasting or any other communication to the public, or to
the subtitling or dubbing of texts, of the work. 330
The Berne Convention expressly allows that national law may require
“undertakings” to contribute to an audiovisual work to be in writing, but that
is strictly optional;331 agreements to perform may be oral or implicit and
thereby impliedly license exploitation of the audiovisual work. The implied
licensing approach only fell short during the Garcia v. Google case for those
judges who believed that Youssef’s fraudulent representations negated step
one of the Effects Associates test.332
4. Will These Filters Remain Robust?
Is it reasonable to expect that these multiple filters will remain robust
going forward as audiovisual production and distribution evolves, or as the
technology to produce high-quality audiovisual works diffuses to more and
more creators? As evidenced through Garcia v. Google, one of the biggest
concerns surrounding actors-as-authors is the audiovisual works on
YouTube, whether we want to call them amateur videos or user-generatedcontent (“UGC audiovisual works”). The concern is that YouTubers333 and
other makers of UGC audiovisual works who are not “professionals,” are
often just starting in their efforts (whether amateur or intended as a business)
and are not in the custom of getting the types of written contracts that are

330

Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 14bis(2)(b), at 11.
See id. art. 14bis(2)(c), at 11 (“The question whether or not the form of the undertaking referred
to above should, for the application of the preceding subparagraph (b), be in a written agreement or a
written act of the same effect shall be a matter for the legislation of the country where the maker of the
cinematographic work has his headquarters or habitual residence.”). Article 14(3) establishes a
presumption that this implied licensing regime does not apply to a film director, screenwriter, or
composer unless “national legislation provides to the contrary.” Id.
332
See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (“Youssef's
fraud alone is likely enough to void any agreement he had with Garcia. But even if it's not, it’s clear
evidence that his inclusion of her performance in ‘Innocence of Muslims’ exceeded the scope of the
implied license and was, therefore, an unauthorized, infringing use.”), dissolved by, 786 F.3d 733 (9th
Cir. 2015) (en banc).
333
YouTuber,
OXFORD
LIVING
DICTIONARIES
(2018),
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/youtuber (“A person who uploads, produces, or appears in
videos on the video-sharing website YouTube.”).
331
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used in the film and television industry. So, the argument goes, a new
industry may be thwarted by such rules. And certainly the salaries earned by
leading YouTubers335 speak to the economic success for some UGC content
on on-line platforms.
Of course, if YouTube videos are an important new business, then it is
fair to say that these audiovisual entrepreneurs should treat their employees
and contributors reasonably. As a general rule, we do not exempt start-ups
from minimum wage and other labor laws; we exempt neither start-ups nor
hobbyists from environmental standards, sanitation laws, or building codes.
Indeed, the claim that creators of UGC audiovisual works should not have
to follow the requirements of the work-for-hire doctrine in order to be free
from the worry of actors asserting rights sounds a bit like Mr. Cohen’s
argument in Effects Associates that Hollywood film producers should be
exempted from the requirement that copyright assignments be in writing
because “[m]oviemakers do lunch, not contracts.”336
B. The Rare, But Unfrightening Prospect of an Actor as a Joint Author
In the extremely rare fact pattern in which none of these filters apply to
the actor’s performance in an audiovisual work, we seem to be left with three
possibilities: (a) the actor is the sole author of the audiovisual work; (b) the
actor is a joint author; or (c) the actor is not an author at all.
This menu makes clear the strange distortion of the Garcia v. Google
case. A finding of joint authorship would not have helped Garcia and
claiming to be the sole author of the whole film would have been
ridiculous,337 so she claimed to be the sole author of something within the
film, and the en banc majority opted to find she was not an author at all.338
Similarly, in the Second Circuit’s 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin339 decision,
film director Merkin disclaimed joint authorship in the finished film Heads
Up and claimed to be the sole author of the “raw” footage—another
untenable claim.340 The appellate panel found that he was not an author at
all.341
334
See Ginsburg, supra note 110 (“But producers of amateur films, including (especially?) those
posted on YouTube and similar platforms, may not be the actors’ employers (indeed, the actors may not
be professionals, either), and may be unaware of the need for written contracts.”).
335
John Lynch, These Are the 19 Most Popular YouTube Stars in the World — and Some Are
Making Millions, BUSINESSINSIDER (Feb. 2, 2018, 8:58 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/mostpopular-youtubers-with-most-subscribers-2018-2 (describing leading YouTubers’ salaries as $15, $7,
and $5.5 million).
336
Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990).
337
Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933.
338
Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 737.
339
791 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015).
340
Id. at 252.
341
Id. at 259, 261.
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In both cases, the individual contributor disclaimed joint authorship, so
neither court frontally addressed whether the actor or director should have
been treated as a joint author. Maintaining the proper balance here is critical
because the producer is the appropriate holder of consolidated economic
rights in an audiovisual work. On the other hand, a finding of “joint
authorship” for an individual contributor to an audiovisual work need not
entitle that person to an equal share of any revenues from exploitation of a
film. A joint owner may be entitled to a very small percentage of income—
or none at all.
But the primary issue is whether an actor may have a bona fide claim to
authorship of a “joint work”—that is, a work “prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”342 While this is not the place for
a full critique of how joint authorship doctrine has developed,343 the
jurisprudence applying this definition has become encumbered with judgecreated requirements that merit some discussion in relation to what actors
(and directors and cinematographers) do in audiovisual works.
1. The “Independently Copyrightable Contribution” Requirement
Beginning in the 1990s, several federal courts recognized a requirement
for joint authorship that “each of the putative co-authors . . . ma[k]e
independently copyrightable contributions to the work.”344 The existence
and nature of this requirement is now a well-known disagreement between
the two leading copyright treatises.345 Paul Goldstein has advocated a strong
form of the requirement, barring joint authorship unless each putative
author’s “contribution represents original expression that could stand on its
own as the subject matter of copyright,”346 a requirement that several courts
seem to have embraced.347 In contrast, the Nimmer treatise has argued that
342

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the
Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 194–96 (2001) (discussing the legislative development of
the definition of “joint works” or joint authorship); Michael Landau, Joint Works Under United States
Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation through Statutory Misinterpretation, 54 IDEA 157, 158–61 (2014)
(discussing case law interpreting the Copyright Act of 1976).
344
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,
507–08 (2d Cir. 1991)). For other appellate decisions adopting the requirement, see Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068–71 (7th Cir. 1994) (adopting a similar standard in the Seventh Circuit);
Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 64 (3d Cir. 2014) (adopting a similar two-prong test in the Third
Circuit).
345
See LaFrance, supra note 343, at 196–98 (summarizing the disagreement).
346
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 184, § 4.2.1.2, at 379 (emphasis added).
347
See, e.g., Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070–71 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the Act supports the validity of
the Goldstein requirement); Berman v. Johnson, 518 F. Supp. 2d 791, 793 (E.D. Va. 2007) (using a jury
instruction that questioned: “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff’s . . .
contributions to the documentary are independently copyrightable?”), aff'd, 315 Fed. Appx. 461 (4th Cir.
2009).
343
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a joint author need only make a non-de minimis intellectual contribution to
the copyrighted work, a contribution which could include ideas—for a
narrative story, ways to reorder scenes, plot points, etc.348 Judge Posner also
aligned himself with this view, reasoning that one co-author might
contribute “brilliant ideas but can’t write; another is an excellent writer, but
his ideas are commonplace.”349 For Posner, such a collaboration would be
paradigmatically “joint authorship” if that is what the two people
intended.350
In reality, any “strong” version of the independently copyrightable
contribution standard may have given way to a more practical standard and
there may be nothing in that standard to prevent an actor’s dramatic
performance being a legitimate platform for a claim of joint authorship.
Early on, Bill Patry proposed that the requirement ought not be taken at face
value and should mean only that “the coauthor’s contribution must be the
product of authorship, i.e., expression,” and not that “a coauthor . . . must be
able to obtain a copyright on his or her separate contribution.”351 In 2015,
the Second Circuit panel in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin seemed to agree,
noting that “[b]y ‘copyrightable’ [the Childress court] meant only to say that
the coauthor’s contribution must be the product of authorship, i.e.,
expression.”352
At the end of the day, a strong “independently copyrightable
contribution” requirement would be incompatible with our common
thinking about films.353 While the contribution of an actor might be
imagined, or even shot, in isolation, there is no original expression from a
film director or cinematographer that can be separated from what is done by
other contributors. Yet in many jurisdictions, film directors are presumed to
348

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, § 6.07(A)(3)(a).
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Here is a typical case from academe.
One professor has brilliant ideas but can’t write; another is an excellent writer, but his ideas are
commonplace. So they collaborate on an academic article, one contributing the ideas, which are not
copyrightable, and the other the prose envelope, and . . . they sign as coauthors. Their intent to be the
joint owners of the copyright in the article would be plain, and that should be enough to constitute them
joint authors within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).”).
350
Id. See also Timothy J. McFarlin, An Idea of Authorship: Orson Welles, The War of the Worlds
Copyright, and Why We Should Recognize Idea-Contributors as Joint Authors, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
701, 706 (2016) (“I believe that this rule—collaborators who contribute ideas, and ideas alone, cannot be
joint authors of copyrightable works—reflects a fundamentally flawed conception of authorship, one
which ignores the reality of the creative process and prevents artists like Welles from obtaining the credit
and compensation they deserve.”).
351
PATRY, supra note 329, § 5:15.
352
16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 255–56 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (“It
seems likely that ‘[b]y “copyrightable” [the Childress court] meant only to say that the coauthor’s
contribution must be the product of authorship, i.e., expression. [The court] did not mean that in order to
be a coauthor one must be able to obtain a copyright on his or her separate contribution,’ or even that
such would be possible.”).
353
Id. at 255 (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507–08 (2d Cir. 1991)).
349
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354

be the authors of audiovisual works. So, the requirement in its strong form
makes little sense for audiovisual works and to the degree courts are
applying a standard that simply requires original expression from a putative
joint author, this creates no problem for actors or directors.
2. “Superintendence,” “Dominance,” and “Masterminds”
In its effort to quash the joint authorship claim of a consultant to Spike
Lee’s Malcolm X, the Aalmuhammed court ran through multiple indicia of
being an author, including that an author is: “the originator or the person
who causes something to come into being”;355 “the ‘person with creative
control’”;356 “he to whom anything owes its origin”;357 and “‘the inventive
or master mind’ who ‘creates or gives effect to the idea.’”358 This emphasis
on “control” or “masterminding” the creation of a work has no obvious
anchor in the definition of a “joint work” or its legislative history.359
If Aalmuhammed were limited to a requirement that each joint author
act as “a ‘mastermind’ with ‘creative control,’”360 then perhaps the
traditional range of principal creative contributors to a film could be
included in the Ninth Circuit’s approach; that might resolve any
inconsistency between Richlin—recognizing that an actor, a director, and a
composer might all be joint authors of a feature film361—and Aalmuhammed.
The problem is the wrongheaded thinking in Aalmuhammed that an author,
sole or joint, must have “superintended the whole work.”362 On its face, that
test bars from authorship of the film the screenwriter, the composer, and the
actor—even when there would be no other actor in the film.
The problem was made worse in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin. There,
the control criterion was firmly transplanted into the Second Circuit, which
had not, until then, “proffered rules for determining which of multiple
authors is ‘dominant.’”363 Since both producer and director arguably
354
For example, in European Union directives, the director of a cinematographic work is expressly
considered an “author.” See, e.g., Council Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2006 on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to
Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, 2006 O.J. (L 376) art. 2, § 2 (“The principal director of a
cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors. Member
States may provide for others to be considered as its co-authors.”).
355
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000).
356
Id.
357
Id. at 1233.
358
Id. at 1234.
359
LaFrance, supra note 343, at 224 (“Not only is the concept of a dominant author utterly absent
from the 1976 Act and its legislative history, but is inconsistent with both.”).
360
Blizzard Entm’t., Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co., No. 3:15-cv-04084, 2017 WL 2118342,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232).
361
Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2008).
362
Aalmuhammud, 202 F.3d at 1233 (emphasis added); Blizzard Entm’t., 2017 WL 2118342, at *1.
363
16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 260 (2d Cir. 2015).
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controlled the “whole work,” the Casa Duse court essentially did a head-tohead comparison of who had more control, finding that “Casa Duse
exercised far more decision[-]making authority”364 and that the district court
was correct in its determination that “Casa Duse was the dominant author”
of the film.365
The 16 Casa Duse language itself reveals the problem: if the inquiry is
to “determin[e] which of multiple authors is ‘dominant,’” one has already
conceded that there are other authors of the work. The requirement that one
“superintend” the work as a whole or “master mind” the work unduly
narrows authorship and eliminates too many creative contributors. As Jay
Dougherty has pointed out, in the extreme the “mastermind” test for
authorship slips into “a mutant species of work for hire basically based on
the right to control.”366 A court considering an actor’s claim of joint
authorship would be better to hone to the statute, the more reasonable
approach in Richlin, and Congress’s clear intent.
3. The Intent to be Joint Authors
Finally, there is the actual statutory requirement: that the numerous
authors have “the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”367 The legislative
history says that “the touchstone here is the intention, at the time the writing
is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit.”368
In the 1991 Childress v. Taylor decision, Judge Newman concluded that
such a plain intention to “merge” contributions would not be enough—
otherwise the statute “would extend joint author status to many persons who
are not likely to have been within the contemplation of Congress.”369
Newman’s primary example was a book editor who “makes numerous useful
revisions to [a] first draft”—both the writer of the first draft and the editor
intend for the revisions to be incorporated into the works, but neither intend
for the editor to become a joint author.370 For joint authorship to occur, the
Childress court required the parties to “entertain in their minds the concept

364

Id.
Id.
366
Dougherty, supra note 296, at 468. See also LaFrance, supra note 343, at 254 (“[The
Aalmuhammed ‘mastermind’ test] would make work made for hire contracts largely superfluous in the
motion picture industry.”).
367
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The statute does not expressly say that all the multiple authors must
have this intention, although that can be reasonably inferred.
368
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (emphasis
added).
369
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
370
Id.
365
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371

of joint authorship.” Courts have adopted this interpretation of the
statutory “intention” requirement with relatively little variation.372
There has been little or no development of what it means for parties to
“intend” to be “joint authors” or to intend “joint authorship.” But one does
not need a PhD in psychology to know that “intentionality” can be complex
and layered; what people “intend” has been subject to much more rigorous
examination in philosophy373 or criminal law than in intellectual property.
In the 1999 Holloway v. United States case,374 the Supreme Court concluded
that “intent” in a criminal statute includes not just “unconditional intent,”
but also “conditional intent”—what one is willing to do to achieve certain
outcomes if certain contingent facts happen.375
The Holloway holding may be limited to “intent” in that particular
federal statute376 or use of “intent” in criminal laws,377 but it also points to
some interesting possibilities: surely there are many circumstances—
perhaps most—where the intent to be joint authors is conditional, i.e., “we
will be joint authors if you do your share of the work.” This is suggested by
the Childress court’s observation that “[a]n inquiry into how the putative
371

Id. at 508.
See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring that
the parties “intended to be joint authors at the time the work was created”); Nordstrom Consulting, Inc.
v. M & S Tech., Inc., No. 06C3234, 2008 WL 623660, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Erickson for the
same proposition); Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(requiring each party to intend “that the work be jointly owned”); Papa’s-June Music, Inc. v. McLean,
921 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (requiring each party to “intend to regard themselves as joint
authors”).
373
G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 321–32 (1956–57) (discussing
the philosophy behind determining human intention); see also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS ¶¶ 197–205 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Macmillan Publ’g Co., 3d ed. 1973) (using the
example of an intention to play chess).
374
526 U.S. 1 (1999).
375
Id. at 7. At issue was a jury instruction given by the District Court. Id. at 4 (“In some cases,
intent is conditional. That is, a defendant may intend to engage in certain conduct only if a certain event
occurs. In this case, the government contends that the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily
harm if the alleged victims had refused to turn over their cars. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had such an intent, the government has satisfied this element of the offense . . . .”).
376
Id. at 6 (“The specific issue in this case is what sort of evil motive Congress intended to describe
when it used the words ‘with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm’ in the 1994 amendment to
the carjacking statute.”).
377
People v. Connors, 97 N.E. 643, 645 (Ill. 1912) (holding that a “specific intent to kill” could be
found even though that intent was “coupled with a condition”); Beall v. State, 101 A.2d 233, 236 (Md.
1953) (following Connors); People v. Vandelinder, 481 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(following Connors); Price v. State, 79 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tenn. 1935) (following Connors). Section
2.02(6) of the Model Penal Code provides: “Requirement of Purpose Satisfied if Purpose is Conditional.
When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is established although such purpose
is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining
the offense.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (AM. LAW INST. 1984). See also Larry Alexander &
Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1140–57
(1997) (discussing the problems related to “conditional purposes”).
372
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joint authors regarded themselves in relation to the work has previously been
part of our approach in ascertaining the existence of joint authorship.”378 It
seems clear that dramatic performers working on an audiovisual work do
have “the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole,”379 but it remains an interesting
question how one would measure intent to be joint authors for a dramatic
performer. Would knowledge of recognition in a film’s credits—along with
everyone else—indicate an intent to be a joint author? Recognition as a
performer? Would an actor’s knowledge of “top-billing” (or “above titlebilling”) increase their sense that they were a joint author?380 Given all that
dramatic performers think about their craft, it seems unlikely that the actor
would think she is not an author.
4. A Joint Author May be Entitled to a (Very) Small Ownership Share
In approaching joint authorship claims in copyright cases, courts have
assumed that a finding of joint authorship will mean that each joint author is
entitled to an equal share of the financial proceeds, distorting joint
authorship inquiries by creating both a high-stakes incentive for parties to
claim joint authorship and a motivation for judges to find against such
claims.381
But nothing in the Copyright Act requires that outcome, and the
legislative history indicates that that was not Congress’s intent. In the
situation of a joint work, the Copyright Act provides that the “authors of a
joint work are co[-]owners of copyright in the work,”382 and makes no
mention of their respective ownership shares. The House Report
accompanying the 1976 Act also lacks any discussion of ownership shares,
but it clearly states that, “[u]nder the bill, as under the present law, co[]owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common.”383
378

Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 504.
380
Top billing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/top%20billing
(last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (defining “top billing” as: (1) “prominent emphasis, featuring, or
advertising”; or (2) “the position at the top of a theatrical bill usually featuring the star’s name”). As one
commentator explains, “[a]nywhere from one to three lead actors are often listed just before the title. It’s
a similar position to the auteur, as the presence of these star actors is the reason many people came to
see the movie.” Peter Bohush, Opening Credits: Who, What, Where, When, and Why?,
NEWENGLANDFILM.COM (Aug. 1, 2012), https://newenglandfilm.com/magazine/2012/08/credits (last
visited Sept. 24, 2018).
381
See Benjamin E. Jaffe, Note, Rebutting the Equality Principle: Adapting the Co-Tenancy Law
Model to Enhance the Remedies Available to Joint Copyright Owners, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1556–
57 (2011) (making similar observations).
382
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). The moral rights provision of the Copyright Act similarly provides
that “[t]he authors of a joint work of visual art are coowners [sic] of the [moral] rights conferred by
subsection (a) in that work.” Id. § 106A(b).
383
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 121 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (emphasis
added).
379
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In interpreting the Copyright Act, courts have traditionally assumed that
Congress intended copyright law to follow common law rules and
principles,384 unless the statute expressly digresses from those rules and
principles.385 In fact, within joint authorship, the duty to account appears to
arise from common law principles; it is not to be found in the statute.386 So
it follows that when Congress chose to impose the structure of a tenancy-incommon on joint authors, Congress should be presumed to have intended to
perpetuate common law principles for determining the tenants’ relative
ownership shares for joint authors. And nothing in those common law
principles requires equal shares among tenants-in-common.
At best, the common law has a rebuttable presumption of equal
ownership shares and that presumption is rebutted by clear evidence of
intent, unequal contribution, or other circumstances establishing that equal
ownership would be inappropriate. At common law, tenants-in-common
simply “need not have equal shares in the property,”387 and there is abundant
case law that unequal contributions by tenants-in-common to the purchase,
development, or maintenance of real property will produce proportionate,
unequal ownership shares.388
384

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (“‘[W]hen a statute covers an
issue previously governed by the common law,’ we must presume that ‘Congress intended to retain the
substance of the common law.’” (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 n.13 (2010))); Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989) (interpreting “employee” and “scope of
employment” in Copyright Act “to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood
by common-law agency doctrine”).
385
This is just part of the broader interpretative canon establishing a presumption that statutes do
not derogate from common law principles. See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 320 (2010) (footnote omitted)
(“The canon of construction that statutes should be interpreted consistently with the common law helps
us interpret a statute that clearly covers a field formerly governed by the common law.”); Astoria Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (citations omitted) (“[W]here a common-law
principle is well established . . . the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an
expectation that the principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’”
(quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))); Isbrandtsen Co., 343 U.S. at 783 (1952)
(“Statutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”).
386
Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he duty to account does not derive from
the copyright law’s proscription of infringement. Rather, it comes from ‘equitable doctrines relating to
unjust enrichment and general principles of law governing the rights of co-owners.”’ (quoting Harrington
v. Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655, 657–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1960))); H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 121 (1985), as reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (“Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners [sic] of a copyright
would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use
or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits.”).
387
2 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 426, at 213 (3d ed. 1939); see
also RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 50.02[5] (Michael Allan Wolf, ed., 2009),
LEXIS (“The undivided fractional shares held by tenants in common are usually equal and are presumed
to be equal unless circumstances indicate otherwise.”).
388
Ordlock v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 47, 88 (2006) (noting that the presumption that tenants in common
have equal ownership shares “may be overcome by contrary evidence”); Anderson v. Broadwell, 6 P.2d
267, 268–69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (holding that among three tenants in common, one was entitled to half
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Against that abundant case law on ownership apportionment among
tenants-in-common, there is quite little case law directly dealing with
apportionment among joint authors.389 The rare, possibly lone case directly
deciding this issue was the 1960 Sweet Music, Inc. v. Melrose Music Corp.390
litigation in which the district court found that two joint authors of a musical
composition were entitled to equal ownership shares of the composition
despite the defendant having written all of the music and what appears to
have been a majority of the lyrics.397 Despite unequal contributions to the
creation of the work, the court found that “[n]o facts [we]re in evidence
indicating that the ownership was intended as other than an undivided onehalf interest for each of the co-authors,”391 and that there was some
evidence—a prior assignment agreement—for the parties to share in the
profits equally.392 The Sweet Music outcome can be explained as the court
believing the evidence of intent undermined the evidence of unequal
interest in property because he paid half the purchase price); Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 879 A.2d 897, 903
(Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (affirming trial court’s use of differing financial contributions of each party toward
the purchase of the property as a “particularly relevant” factor in its determination of equities between
the co-tenants); Schroeder v. Todd, 86 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Iowa 1957) (“Proof of unequal contribution to
purchase price of realty by grantees, in conveyance to purchasers of tenancy in common, overcomes
presumption that they take equal shares, and raises presumption they intended to share in proportion to
amounts contributed by each.”); Lemay v. Hardin, 48 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (awarding one
tenant in common disproportionate share on the basis of the cost of repairs, improvements, or other
property-related expenses unilaterally incurred by the tenant); Spector v. Giunta, 405 N.E.2d 327, 331
(Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (affirming lower court order distributing property interests in proportion to the
contributions of each party, but remanding to allow further evidence showing contributions made for
repairs and improvements to the property); Cudmore v. Cudmore, 311 N.W.2d 47, 49 (S.D. 1981) (“This
[equality] presumption is rebuttable, however, by a showing of unequal contribution . . . [which] raises a
new presumption that the grantees intended to share in proportion to their contribution.”); Huffman v.
Mulkey, 14 S.W. 1029, 1031 (Tex. 1890) (determining tenant in common’s share by contribution to the
total price of the deed); Cummings v. Anderson, 614 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (“[W]hen
in rebuttal it is shown that they contributed unequally to the purchase price, a presumption arises that
they intended to share the property proportionately to the purchase price.”).
389
See Jaffe, supra note 381, at 1556 (“[T]here is very little case law directly dealing with the issue
of apportioning profits in an accounting action.”); A.E. Korpela, Rights and Remedies of Co-Owners of
Copyright, 3 A.L.R.3d 1301 § 6(b) (2011) (“[Because of the] dearth of case law on the subject, there
appears to be little source material for discussion of the basis for determining the shares of copyright coowners in accounting.”). Because of the lack of copyright case law on this point, it might be mentioned
that in patent law, each co-inventor has complete freedom to use and license the invention without any
duty to account to the other co-inventor(s). But this reflects a difference in the statutes. 17 USC §201(a)
provides that “[t]he authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work” and the legislative
history ties this to Joint tenancy and all that goes with it. In contrast, 35 USC § 262 expressly provides
that “[i]n the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make,
use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the patented invention
into the United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.”
390
189 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
397
Id. at 659.
391
Id.
392
Id. (“The 1939 assignment, providing for advance royalties to be paid to Sweet and Grant, states
that these royalties are ‘to be divided equally between them.’”).
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contribution, but there are also statements in the opinion indicating the judge
did not fully understand ownership shares in tenancy-in-common.393
The idea that joint authorship requires equal ownership shares—what
one commentator calls the “equality principle”394—is just a notion that pops
up in dicta repeatedly with courts seeming to mistake “equal undivided
interests in the whole work”395 for purposes of exploitation of rights to mean
an “equal ownership share.”396 The better rule is the common law principle
governing tenants-in-common: that tenants-in-common “need not have
equal shares in the property,”397 and clear evidence of the parties’ intent or
the parties’ unequal contribution can lead to allocation of unequal,
proportionate shares. Proof of differing contributions in copyright joint
authorship cases will not be particularly different than proof of differing
contributions in real property disputes. Proof of intent to have differing
ownership shares can also readily be part of the evidence before a court in a
copyright dispute.398 Indeed, with musical compositions it is very common
for authors to establish unequal shares in their royalties documentation.399
Eliminating any irrebuttable presumption of equal shares could dampen
the enthusiasm of some litigants to make joint authorship claims, but a
court’s conclusion that someone is a “joint author” still gives that person the
opportunity to license a work non-exclusively as well as to prevent exclusive
licensing of the work. In short, these claims still pose both a substantial risk
and a meaningful nuisance to film producers and others who consolidate the
economic rights in complex works.400 In other words, a willingness to
393

Id. at 657–59.
See Jaffe, supra note 381, at 1550 (citation omitted) (“Furthermore, the courts’ application of
the accounting remedy in copyright law has resulted in the conclusive presumption that absent an
agreement to the contrary, joint copyright authors possess equal ownership interests in a work (the
equality principle).”).
395
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Joint authorship entitles the co-authors
to equal undivided interests in the whole work—in other words, each joint author has the right to use or
to license the work as he or she wishes, subject only to the obligation to account to the other joint owner
for any profits that are made.”).
396
See Jaffe, supra note 381, at 1550.
397
TIFFANY, supra note 387, § 426, at 213.
398
See, e.g., Janky v. Lake County Conv. & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“Similarly, she filed a document with the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) stating that Farag held a 10 percent ‘ownership share.’”).
399
For example, colleagues at ASCAP report that it is currently very common for authors to
stipulate unequal shares in their ASCAP documentation. As one example, a band may agree to apportion
every main member in the group a writing credit, but give the song’s main writer the lion's share. Email
correspondence with Mr. Sam Mosenkis, Vice President, Business and Legal Affairs, ASCAP, July 3,
2018 [on file with author]; Email correspondence with Seth Saltzman, Senior Vice President, ASCAP,
July 5, 2018 [on file with author].
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NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, § 6.12(A) (“[I]n the present era of mass
communications, use by one joint owner practically destroys the value of the copyright, and in effect
precludes the other joint owner from himself using the work . . . .”). But because a joint authorship dispute
is likely to be litigated after exploitation of the work is well underway, the threat embodied in a
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recognize unequal shares among joint authors would correct judicial fears of
windfalls to undeserving litigants without diminishing film producers’
incentives to get work-for-hire arrangements properly in place.
CONCLUSION
Among the different kinds of works eligible for copyright, audiovisual
works are arguably the most complex, often involving scores of
contributors—screenwriters, directors, actors, cinematographers, producers,
set designers, costume designers, lighting technicians, etc. Some countries
expressly recognize which categories of these contributors are entitled to
legal protection, whether copyright, “neighboring rights,” or statutory
remuneration. But American copyright law does not. Given that the complex
relationship among these creative contributors is usually governed by
contract, there has been—for such a large economic sector—relatively little
discussion of authorship in audiovisual works.
But glimmers of case law, pronouncements from the U.S. government,
and commentary from scholars support the conclusion that actors can be
“authors” under American copyright law. Indeed, any other conclusion
would be inconsistent with basic principles of our copyright law.
The Ninth Circuit’s 2015 en banc decision in Garcia v. Google is
sometimes misunderstood as denying copyright protection to actors. But the
Garcia decision was more about fraud and fatwas than clear conclusions on
how copyright law applies to actors and acting. Stepping back from the
strange facts of Garcia, the same principles that allow us to recognize
copyright in a musician’s recorded performance of a preexisting musical
composition should apply to an actor’s recorded performance of a script.
Certainly, people in the acting community believe that their work is
expressive, using the same terminology as other creative communities.
Recognizing that actors’ performances are original expression subject to
copyright protection does not lead inextricably to a “copyright of thousands”
problems because of the robust mechanisms—both legal and customary—
that consolidate rights and permissions in a film with the film producer. On
the rare occasion when those filters fail and we are forced to determine if an
actor is an author of an audiovisual work, a finding of joint authorship need
not be disruptive of a film producer’s successful exploitation of the film.

declaration of joint authorship might be blunted to some degree. It might also be the case that joint authors
should be declared fiduciaries of one another, mitigating any market-undermining actions. See Avner D.
Sofer, Joint Authorship: An Uncomfortable First with Tenancy in Common. 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
1, 3 (1998) (proposing that joint authors should be fiduciaries to one another). For a bolder proposal, see
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1015, 1055 (2015)
(proposing trusts in which one joint author is “owner-trustee” with full managerial power, while all other
joint authors are “owner-beneficiaries”).

